African Nations Push to Strengthen Mineral Diplomacy
Africa’s strategic minerals are no longer just economic assets. They are levers of power. Gold in the Sahel, cobalt and lithium in the DRC, fuel alliances, arm militias and shape global partnerships. According to experts, how these resources are governed will decide whether they drive industrial growth or entrench conflict and dependency.
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Mineral resources are increasingly being leveraged as bargaining chips in diplomacy, conflict mediation, and security arrangements.
Across Africa, the rise in resource-for-security exchanges is being used to secure allies and acquire military support.
Experts note that using Africa’s strategic minerals as active diplomatic tools is reshaping how states navigate external pressures, internal conflicts, and geopolitical rivalries. However, how these resources are governed will decide whether they drive industrial growth or entrench conflict and dependency.
According to Hanri Mostert, SARChI chair for mineral law in Africa at the University of Cape Town, these mining-related deals “link mining governance with ongoing security cooperation, a sign that mineral strategy and foreign‑security alignment are now formally intertwined.”
“Effective governance of strategic minerals is critical… how states manage access, transparency, and value addition directly shapes whether these resources become instruments for industrial growth and stable development, or whether they fuel conflict, empower armed actors, and deepen dependency on external powers.”
Recent commentary by the African Policy Research Institute in September 2025 observed, “competition over Africa’s natural resources has crystallised around distinct playbooks such as Russia’s use of private military companies, the US’ peace-brokering model, and China’s infrastructure-for-resources strategy.”
“Together, they reveal not only rival economic ambitions but also competing visions of how to turn Africa’s resources into geopolitical leverage.”
In the Central African Republic, gold concessions have increasingly been linked to foreign security contractors.
The Ndassima gold mine, situated about 60 km north of Bambari, provides a clear example. For the past three to four years, the site has been operated by Midas Resources, a company connected to Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Russian Wagner Group. Midas is one of several Wagner-linked entities sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in June 2023, underscoring the role of private military actors in securing access to strategic mineral wealth.
Similar patterns are emerging in Mali, where gold is shaping both economic and security decisions. In June 2025, the junta-led government launched construction of a new gold refinery near Bamako in partnership with Russia’s Yadran Group. Under the agreement, the state retains a 62% stake, while the plant is slated to refine 200 metric tons of gold annually, nearly quadruple Mali’s 2024 output.
Analysts interpret the timing and choice of partner as “more than economic policy.”
“The refinery deal appears to link mining governance with ongoing security cooperation, a sign that mineral strategy and foreign‑security alignment are now formally intertwined,” according to Hanri Mostert, SARChI chair for mineral law in Africa, University of Cape Town.
Mali’s growing engagement with Russia extends beyond the refinery project. The two countries have strengthened diplomatic ties, with Moscow providing military training, security support, and political backing to the junta-led government.
In Sudan, gold has become a direct source of military power. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) controls key mines and refineries and reportedly smuggled over US$850 million in 2024–2025 to fund operations, bypassing state oversight. Both the RSF and the army now embed mineral production within conflict-financing networks, turning resources into weapons of influence.
Once state-regulated mines, especially in Darfur and Kordofan, are now effectively militia-run zones. A November 2025 report by Dawan Africa estimates 70–80% of gold output avoids official channels, showing how mineral wealth is used to sustain armed power and political leverage, a clear example of resource-for-security dynamics in action.
According to think tanks and policy institutes assessing these patterns, what makes this moment different is that the political use of minerals is increasingly tied to security guarantees, rather than just infrastructure or trade.
The demand for critical raw materials vital in the manufacture of batteries, renewable energy, electronics, and defence hardware is expected to nearly triple by 2030, according to the UN.
In return, there has been a global scramble for these critical minerals, widening the bargaining space for African governments to negotiate deals combining economic incentives, diplomatic alignment, and security support.
The African Policy Institute observes that “resources-for-security arrangements, whether via PMCs or infrastructure-for-resources models, highlight competing visions of how to turn Africa’s resources into geopolitical leverage.”
Across the Sahel, minerals and security are tightly intertwined. Gold sites in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are increasingly associated with non-state armed actors and foreign security partners. Control over mining corridors often determines who can project power in contested regions, making minerals both the prize and the fuel of conflict dynamics.
The pattern extends beyond gold. In central and eastern Africa, cobalt, copper, lithium, tantalum, and rare earths are emerging as strategic assets. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, hosts some of the world’s largest reserves of cobalt, copper, lithium, manganese, and tantalum, essential for AI, electric vehicles, renewable energy, and military systems. In the eastern DRC alone, more than 130 armed groups compete for control of mines producing tungsten, tantalum, and gold (the 3TG complex).
A US-brokered peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda in June 2025 illustrates modern resource-for-security arrangements. The deal links access to mineral supply chains with US security support, though the precise scope of that support is vague.
The structure mirrors previous US transactions elsewhere, privileging direct resource access over soft power or long-term development.
Russia employs a different model, using PMCs to provide security in exchange for resource concessions in countries like the Central African Republic, Sudan, Mozambique, and the Sahel.
In contrast, China’s approach relies on infrastructure-for-resources agreements. Over the last two decades, Chinese companies have built roads, ports, hydropower plants, industrial parks, and railways in Africa.
Many deals, under the Belt and Road Initiative or the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, secure long-term access to strategic minerals while avoiding overt military entanglements. Beijing also extends security cooperation through peacekeeping, private security, and dual-use infrastructure, enhancing its strategic footprint without assuming formal combat roles.
In 2025, BRI-linked investment in Africa reached US$39 billion, with around US$10 billion allocated to mining and processing projects. These arrangements pair critical infrastructure, ports, railways, and power facilities with long-term access to minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, and rare earths.
The Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates this approach. Chinese state-owned firms hold majority stakes in mines such as the Sicomines/Dikuluwe venture while financing infrastructure projects, including railways and hospitals. This secures decades-long mineral supply for China while providing development investments for local communities, all without formal military engagement.
Beyond the DRC, Chinese firms are active across southern and eastern Africa, including copper in Botswana, lithium and cobalt in Zambia, and mineral processing plants in Namibia and Zimbabwe.
However, experts note there is potential upside. If African states negotiate from positions of strength, demanding transparency, local value addition, and parliamentary oversight, minerals can advance industrialisation and security reforms.
“Whether these deals enable sustainable development or reinforce dependency depends on the strength of institutions, the capacity of governments to negotiate favourable agreements, regional coordination and transparency in minerals-related deals.”
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