Ecuador’s Declining Oil Output Threatens to Spark an Economic Crisis
The last decade has been especially grueling for Ecuador’s economically vital oil industry. Plummeting investment, heavily corroded infrastructure, endemic corruption, violent protests, severe oil spills and rising insecurity are all weighing on operations. The sharp decline in oil production is weighing heavily on government finances at a time of increased spending due to a national security crisis. To rescue the economically crucial industry and boost fiscal revenue, President Daniel Noboa launched a $47 billion plan to revive Ecuador’s crumbling hydrocarbon sector. Already, this ambitious plan is encountering considerable opposition, with evidence of Ecuador’s oil production being stuck in a death spiral.
Ecuador’s oil industry is locked in a death spiral from which it appears incapable of recovering. For the first nine months of 2025, an average of 430,542 barrels per day was lifted in Ecuador. While for September 2025, output averaged 468,295 barrels per day, which is marginally lower than the 469,232 barrels per day lifted for the same period a year earlier. As the chart below, from Ecuador’s central bank, shows oil production has steadily declined since 2019, after it peaked at 555,228 barrels per day during November that year.
Ecuador National Oil Production (Barrels Per Day)
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.
The latest numbers indicate Ecuador’s annual 2025 oil production will be the lowest in over a decade. Indeed, recent estimates put petroleum output at around 465,369 barrels per day, which is significantly lower than the 556,554 barrels per day lifted in 2014 when the Andean country’s oil production peaked. Such a sharp decline, with no clear strategy to sustainably expand output, underscores the dire plight facing Ecuador’s economically crucial hydrocarbon sector.
This is particularly worrying because of the vital role petroleum plays in Ecuador’s economy. Crude oil is the Andean country’s number one export, accounting for nearly 30% of all exports by value. This makes Ecuador’s energy patch an important source of fiscal revenue and a key driver of gross domestic product (GDP). Indeed, crude oil generates around a third of government revenue and accounts for 7.5% of GDP. Sharply declining oil production is sharply impacting Quito’s budget at a time of heightened spending because of surging violence and lawlessness connected to cocaine trafficking, with Ecuador a major narcotics transshipment hub.
Ecuador’s oil and tax revenues for the first nine months of 2025 totaled $14 billion, barely covering 70% of Quito’s spending. The shortfall was then funded by additional debt. Indeed, weaker oil prices and the poor outlook for petroleum, because of a growing supply glut, are sharply impacting Quito’s finances. By September 2025, it was estimated that the annual fiscal deficit had blown out to 4.4% of GDP, a substantial increase from the 2% originally forecast. Quito’s budgetary situation is worsening, with the 2026 fiscal deficit expected to expand. However, with the Noboa government ending costly fuel subsidies, the exact amount is unknown.
If those events are not enough to justify growing fears of Ecuador suffering an economic meltdown, there are the additional complications created by Quito’s oil-backed debt. While complete data is unavailable, at the start of 2022, Ecuador set out to renegotiate the terms of $4.4 billion in oil-backed loans owed to China. While Quito and Beijing never revealed the exact loan details, it is estimated that 90% of Ecuador’s oil exports were shipped to China to service this debt. The value of this oil was tied to formulas that allowed Beijing to pay significantly less than the international market price, seeing Quito lose huge sums of revenue. Indeed, some Chinese firms were then selling the oil on international energy markets at a profit.
During September 2022, then-President Guillermo Lasso renegotiated the terms of $3.2 billion in debt owed to the Beijing-controlled China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. Those negotiations bore considerable fruit for Quito but have done little to alleviate the current fiscal crisis buffeting the Noboa government. President Lasso was able to extend the maturity of the $1.4 billion debt with China Development Bank to 2027 and the $1.8 billion with Export-Import Bank of China to 2032. Ecuador also reduced the interest rate for the debt with the Export-Import Bank of China and suspended all amortizations for six months. This is estimated to have provided $1.4 billion of debt relief to Ecuador.
Most importantly, this freed an unspecified number of oil cargoes from the loan agreements, allowing Ecuador to sell that petroleum at the prevailing market price, generating millions of dollars in additional income at a crucial time. Nonetheless, falling oil production means there are fewer cargoes to be sold on international energy markets. This, coupled with significantly weaker prices, is causing the oil revenue earned by Quito to fall sharply at a critical moment for a government awash in debt, with fiscal spending spiraling higher. Quito’s pressing need for additional income to make up for a spending shortfall has seen Ecuador take on additional debt.
On top of the $4.4 billion in oil-backed debt, an already heavily indebted Quito has received substantial loans from other parties to fund budget shortfalls. The government recently received a $400 million loan from Beijing-controlled PowerChina for renewable power projects, at a time when Ecuador is experiencing an energy crisis. Then in June 2025, the Inter-American Development Bank approved a $400 million loan to boost spending on security and combating organized crime in Ecuador, with the homicide rate soaring nearly sixfold over the last five years to 39 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.
Quito’s fiscal position is so desperate that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently approved an augmentation for its loan program with Ecuador. The IMF added $1 billion to the existing facility, increasing the limit from $4 billion to $5 billion. Given the Noboa government’s dire financial position, the IMF, with assistance from international partners, also provided an additional $600 million in immediately accessible funds for Ecuador. By the end of September 2025, Quito had drawn a whopping $6.6 billion from the IMF. Ecuador’s public debt is an eye-watering $80 billion, leaving the impoverished nation with a worrying debt to GDP ratio of 62%.
According to economists, such a high debt-to-GDP ratio puts Ecuador on the verge of insolvency, particularly at a time when fiscal revenue is declining and spending is surging higher. Former Minister of Economy, Mauricio Pozo, believes excessive, unsustainable spending by the Noboa administration will cause the fiscal deficit to spiral to $4.6 billion. This amounts to 4% of Ecuador’s GDP, or nearly double the 2% target mandated by the IMF. Such a high debt-to-GDP ratio coupled with a ballooning fiscal deficit, is weighing heavily on Quito’s ability to raise additional financing while funding urgently needed infrastructure and public goods.
Plummeting oil production is further complicating Quito’s difficult fiscal predicament because it means fewer cargoes are sold at the international spot price, further impacting government revenue. There is also the impending loss of production due to the gradual closure of oil block 43 situated in the Yasuni National Park, located in Ecuador’s Amazon. The block, owned and operated by national oil company Petroecuador, commenced operation in 2016, pumping 55,000 barrels per day or 20 million barrels annually. That hydrocarbon output will be lost when the block is completely shuttered, with no clear indication of how it will be replaced, potentially costing Quito millions of dollars in income.
After initially committing to pumping over 500,000 barrels per day for 2025, Ecuador’s government has revised its annual production lower to 465,369 barrels per day. This will be the lowest petroleum annual output in over two decades, which, when coupled with weaker oil prices, will significantly impact Quito’s revenue. If production falls further, Ecuador may be placed in the difficult position of being unable to deliver sufficient oil shipments to China to meet repayment obligations. For these reasons, President Noboa’s $47 billion plan to reinvigorate Ecuador’s oil industry is all but essential to the country’s finances, although there is increasing evidence that this initiative is unsustainable and will fail.
