From Kyiv to Kinshasa: Five Lessons for Governments Navigating Mineral-for-Security Deals

From Kyiv to Kinshasa: Five Lessons for Governments Navigating Mineral-for-Security Deals

As the ink was drying on the recent Ukraine-United States agreement, questions quickly arose: could this approach, which puts mineral resources at the heart of security diplomacy, serve as a model for mineral producing countries in Africa and beyond? Today’s announcement of a U.S.-brokered agreement around the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with Rwandan-backed rebels raises the possibility of a frequently mentioned linked U.S. minerals deal being a next step, making it timely to consider implications of the Ukraine deal elsewhere.

With the Trump administration having set the tone by aggressively linking U.S. diplomacy to commercial and geopolitical mineral competition, a wave of state-to-state mining agreements may well be coming—with some focused on the minerals-security nexus.

Some governments and stakeholders in mineral-producing countries may view these new deals with trepidation, not least given the intense diplomatic pressure pushing them to the negotiating table, the role minerals have long played in conflicts and some negative experiences with somewhat analogous resource-for-infrastructure deals in past decades. Others may welcome a novel structure to support their broader security or development ambitions. Regardless of their orientation, lessons from Ukraine’s newly signed deal and earlier African country experiences can help governments navigate this environment of deal-making in the pressure cooker of the current geopolitical moment.

Choices made by Ukraine and other countries in the context of war and an urgent need for international support should be understood accordingly. Still, governments have important lessons to draw upon, including around the importance of transparency, the need to look beyond rhetoric to the concrete lasting obligations, the challenges of valuing mineral resources and what’s received in return, and how to advance long-term objectives while prioritizing short-term security needs.

Transparency is essential

The frequent lack of public information about state-to-state mineral partnerships often makes them difficult to scrutinize. As with mining contracts generally, transparency—including around the parties involved and responsible for implementation—is essential to building public trust, deterring corruption and helping ensure fair returns to a country’s citizens.

In this sense, it is noteworthy that one of the main agreements constituting the Ukraine-U.S. deal was published by the Ukrainian government (though not simultaneously by the U.S. government) and approved by the Ukrainian legislature. This publication at least allows stakeholders to probe some of the details around two main features of the deal, namely (i) a joint investment fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine using, in part, Ukrainian government resource revenues, and (ii) commitments by the Ukrainian government to the U.S. regarding investment opportunities and offtake rights in future resource projects in Ukraine.

However, some key terms—namely those detailing contributions and withdrawals from the fund, are not set out in the published agreement, but in a separate “LP agreement,” reportedly signed weeks later, which has not been disclosed. Without transparency of the full deal documentation, stakeholders cannot have a full understanding of the deal.

African experience with resource-backed loans or resource-for-infrastructure arrangements reinforces the importance of transparency. Like today’s mineral-security deals, those deals involved mineral-producing countries using their natural resources to achieve largely unrelated benefits (e.g., financing for infrastructure in exchange for future natural resources) and often involved a global power government. For example, transparency concerns have plagued multiple stages of the DRC-China Sicomines deal, from the initial agreement to a 2017 amendment, the latest 2024 renegotiation and its ongoing implementation.

Civil society organizations in the DRC have raised concerns that a potential U.S. mineral deal risks repeating the opacity that characterized the Sicomines deal. The fact that the Congolese public apparently first learned of the potential deal with the U.S. through American media rather than their own government underscores this concern. On the other hand, the DRC government has recently published the names of the team coordinating the U.S. negotiations, aiming to reinforce public trust and preempt potential corruption concerns. The government should continue to prioritize transparency, particularly in any next step economic negotiations, allowing the public to have a better understanding of the DRC’s expectations in this process.

Rhetoric doesn’t always match reality…

Transparency is important in part because with complex arrangements such as mineral partnership agreements, the devil is in the details. In negotiating or evaluating a deal, producer-country governments and stakeholders —such as civil society and parliamentarians— must look beyond the rhetoric to understand the actual terms and lasting obligations.

For example, media coverage of the Ukraine-U.S. agreement, has focused on U.S. preferential access to Ukrainian minerals and Ukraine avoiding an obligation to repay earlier U.S. for earlier military assistance. But in each of these cases, the actual terms of the agreement provide less certainty than the political rhetoric suggests.

On U.S. access to Ukrainian minerals, the White House fact sheet suggests that future natural resource projects in Ukraine are there for the U.S.’s taking: “If the United States decides to acquire these resources for ourselves, we will (sic) given first choice to either acquire them or designate the purchaser of our choice.” In practice, Ukraine achieved agreement terms that are more nuanced, clarifying that any preferential offtake terms apply only to certain resource projects and would need to be negotiated based on “market-based commercial terms.” And while the agreement mentions “certain restrictions” on offtake by others (to be detailed in the LP Agreement), the published agreement does not mention a U.S. right to designate a purchaser.

On Ukraine not repaying the U.S., this is, strictly speaking, accurate and an improvement for Ukraine from earlier Trump administration positions. However, the only specified financial commitment from either party in the published agreement is Ukraine contributing “Ukraine Agreed Revenues” (i.e., 50 percent of royalties, fees, etc. from certain resource projects) into a fund reported jointly and equally owned by the Ukraine and the U.S.. And while some sources reference the US also making financial contributions into the fund, the published agreement includes no such commitment.

Furthermore, mention in the published agreement of future military assistance counting as an “increase” in the U.S. contribution could be interpreted (unless otherwise addressed in the LP agreement) as the U.S. having already contributed to the fund. In such an interpretation, the agreement’s provisions could be viewed as a sort of conversion of “debt” (for prior U.S. military support) into “equity” for the US in the fund. Nevertheless, the narrative that Ukraine owes no repayment to the U.S. has prevailed. Ultimately the real balance seems to depend on (i) the eventual significance of the “Ukraine Agreed Revenues” and (ii) the eventual rules around withdrawal of money from the fund and any further commitments to contribute into the fund, which were to be set out in the separate undisclosed LP Agreement.

…but perceptions matter too

While analyzing deal terms is essential, the Ukraine experience shows that it is not only hard contractual obligations that matter. Even if the deal is, as some commentators have noted, unlikely to lead to significant resources or revenues changing hands anytime soon, signing it does appear to have contributed to changing the dynamic between the U.S. and Ukraine.

It has relieved pressure on Ukraine from the Trump administration and opened the door to further U.S. diplomatic support, putting the possibility of additional US military assistance back on the table for the first time under this administration. In that sense, the deal has perhaps already helped Ukraine achieve some of its short-term objectives with a U.S. administration eager to tout “deals,” even if future U.S.-Ukraine relations remain uncertain in a volatile geopolitical context. As African governments weigh the pros and cons of similar deals, these relationship considerations will certainly be a factor driving decision amidst imperfect choices.

More broadly, the Ukraine deal shows that even in power imbalances, it is possible to improve terms through negotiations. Ukrainian officials were able to at least partly resist pressure and improve the deal terms from the earlier White House proposals with apparently significantly worse terms for Ukraine, though this also depends on the terms of the undisclosed LP agreement.

Governments need to rigorously assess the value of mineral resources and what is offered in return

Fairly valuing mineral resources is always challenging in mining deals due to uncertainty around geology, prices and costs. For the Ukraine agreement, estimating the value of the “Ukraine Agreed Revenues” comes with its own challenges, but using data from Ukraine’s EITI reports on previous government resource revenues and various scenarios on the value of Ukraine’s mineral resources, while not foolproof, could help.

The valuation challenge is even greater in mineral-for-security or resource-for-infrastructure deals when assessing what is received in return for minerals. For example, the Sicomines deal has been criticized for trading significant mineral wealth for inadequate roads and poor equipment.

Security deals add further complexity because military and diplomatic assistance are often opaque and harder to value. The valuation needs to also account for the impact of such assistance. For example, while a deal between Kinshasa, Kigali and Washington could potentially address the conflict with the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels, valuing that security assistance and its impact on human rights and the economy, including on the mining sector—is difficult given there are more than 140 armed groups active in Eastern Congo.

In mineral security arrangements, a key potential benefit for producer countries, be it Ukraine or DRC, is the promotion of future resource-sector investment. But in practice achieving this often goes well beyond what is covered in the agreement. For example in Ukraine, the significant private sector investment required is unlikely until the conflict ends, especially as an estimated half of the country’s mineral wealth is currently under Russian occupation.

In the DRC, besides the security context, other challenges hindering Western mining investment include: lack of sufficient energy and transport infrastructure, a difficult business environment and Chinese market dominance. Many known deposits have already been ceded to foreign companies, limiting the DRC government’s options. Also, lack of certified geological data in certain areas, notably in rebel-controlled areas, further complicate valuation.

Short term security needs will understandably be prioritized, but impacts on long term objectives should also be considered

Any eventual DRC-US agreement may therefore also be judged by Congolese stakeholders partly on whether it supports or undermines these ambitions. This is complicated by the possibility that a DRC-U.S. deal could involve Rwanda. One report suggests an eventual deal could involve “the creation of an industrial zone in Congo that would export processed metals via its neighbors,” while others indicate that Kigali sees negotiations “as an opportunity to legitimize access to Congolese resources and attract investment to expand its own existing metals processing.” The latter outcome could face criticism that negotiations prioritize short-term political survival of the governing coalition over the country’s long-term development goals.

Conclusion

The new context of state-to-state mining agreements may reshape what a “good deal” means for mineral-producing counties. As the DRC and others consider such arrangements—especially minerals-for-security deals—lessons from Ukraine and earlier resource-for-infrastructure deals can offer valuable guidance.

Given the polarized geopolitical context in which these deals are being negotiated, producer countries can benefit from maintaining strategic neutrality as much as possible. This is important for countries like the DRC to safeguard sovereignty and retain control over policy- making and the national development trajectory.

Ultimately, any deal will be judged on its implementation and impact. Transparent and measurable implementation will be essential to ensure benefits reach the population.