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Full Text: OSP Concludes Probe Into Airbus Scandal

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Full Text: OSP Concludes Probe Into Airbus Scandal

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) has concluded its investigation into the Airbus bribery scandal, identifying former President John Dramani Mahama as ‘Government Official 1’ in the case.

However, the investigation found no evidence that Mahama received any bribes.

Special Prosecutor Kissi Agyebeng announced the findings at a news conference on Thursday, August 8, stating that the conclusion comes after a comprehensive four-year investigation.

Mr Agyebeng emphasized that the identification of individuals involved was necessary due to the significant public interest surrounding the case.

Read Full Document Below:

Report of Investigation into Alleged Bribery of Ghanaian Officials by Airbus SE 

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8 August 2024

OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

1.0 Introduction 

1.1 The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) presents this report on an investigation into alleged bribery of high-ranking Ghanaian officials by Airbus  SE, through intermediaries, in respect of the sale of military transport aircraft by  Airbus SE to the Republic of Ghana between 2009 and 2015. The investigation  was conducted upon a referral by the President of the Republic. 

1.2 This report has been heavily redacted in the interest of national security – especially in respect of the correspondence and deliberations involving the  Presidency, Cabinet, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defence, the Ghana  Armed Forces, Airbus SE, and a subsidiary of Airbus SE. 

1.3 This report is founded on sections 2 and 3 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor  Act, 2017 (Act 959) and regulation 31(1)(g) of the Office of the Special  Prosecutor (Operations) Regulations, 2018 (L.I. 2374). 

2.0 Airbus SE  

2.1 Airbus SE (Airbus) is a European multinational aerospace corporation. It  designs and manufactures commercial aircraft, helicopters, defence, and space  equipment and aircraft. It is one of the two largest manufacturers of commercial  aircraft in the world (the other being The Boeing Company). It is registered in  Leiden, Netherlands under the corporate law of the European Union, and its  headquarters are located in the Occitanie region of France, near the Toulouse 

Blagnac Airport. 

3.0 The Referral 

3.1 By correspondence dated 2 February 2020 addressed to the Special Prosecutor,  the Secretary to the President, Nana Bediatuo Asante, communicated that he had  been directed by the President of the Republic to refer to the OSP, allegations  of bribery made against Ghanaian officials in an approved judgment of the  Crown Court at Southwark in the United Kingdom, delivered on 31 January  2020 by the Rt. Hon. Dame Victoria Sharp, the President of the Queen’s Bench  Division, in the matter titled Director of the Serious Fraud Office v. Airbus SE (Case  No: U20200108).  

3.2 The 2 February 2020 referral recounted that according to the Statement of Facts  in the case, between 2009 and 2015, a number of Airbus employees made or 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

promised success-based commission payments of approximately five million Euros to a person described as Intermediary 5, who was said to be a close relative  of a high-ranking elected Ghanaian official (described as Government Official  1). The referral narrated that significantly, the Statement of Facts stated that  Government Official 1 was a key decision maker in respect of Government of  Ghana aircraft orders; and that payments to Intermediary 5 by officials of Airbus  SE were intended to induce or reward improper favour by Government Official  1 in respect of the purchase of three C-295 military transport aircraft. The  referral also related that indeed, out of the five million Eurus promised to  Intermediary 5, 3.8 million Euros was paid between March 2012 and February  2014.  

3.3 Further, the referral indicated that similar conclusions had been reached by  investigative and judicial authorities in the United States in the case of United  States of America v. Airbus SE (Case No: 1:20-cr-00021 (TFH)). 

3.4 The referral requested that given the implications of the judgment, the OSP may  collaborate with its United Kingdom and other foreign counterparts to conduct  a prompt inquiry to determine the complicity or otherwise of any Ghanaian  government official, past or present, involved in the scandal and to take the  necessary legal action against such official, as required by Ghanaian law.  

4.0 Investigation and Judicial Pronouncements by Relevant Foreign  Authorities  

4.1 On 31 January 2020, three courts, one each in the United States of America, the  United Kingdom, and France simultaneously delivered similar decisions  containing agreed outcomes (variously described as Consent Agreement,  Deferred Prosecution Agreement, or Judicial Public Interest Agreement,  depending on the jurisdiction) between Airbus SE and the relevant authorities  in the three jurisdictions. The apparently coordinated judicial decisions imposed  global financial sanctions in excess of 3.9 billion Euros on Airbus SE. 

4.2 The agreed judicial decisions were the outcome of joint investigations carried  out by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) of the United Kingdom and the French  Parquet National Financier (PNF), and a parallel investigation conducted by the  United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States Department  of State (DOS) – in respect of alleged bribery and corruption and violations of  the United States International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) involving  Airbus SE in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Indonesia, China, Columbia, Nepal,  South Korea, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Russia, and Ghana.

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

4.3 The alleged bribery offences of Airbus in respect of Ghana was investigated by  the SFO, while the DOJ investigated violations by Airbus of parts 126.1, 129,  and 130 of ITAR in the context of the alleged bribery offences in relation to  Ghana. Therefore, the judicial decisions by the courts in the United Kingdom 

(UK) and the United States (US) affected Ghana. Consequently, the  investigations carried out by the SFO and DOJ and the decisions of the two  courts bear on the investigation by the OSP and thus, require recourse and in  some detail. 

United Kingdom 

4.4 It is well-known that on 31 January 2020, the President of the Queen’s Bench  Division, the Rt. Hon. Dame Victoria Sharp, sitting in the Crown Court at  Southwark, delivered a final declaration and order in respect of a Deferred  Prosecution Agreement (DPA) between the SFO and Airbus in the case of  Director of the Serious Fraud Office v. Airbus SE. This was based on investigation  conducted by the SFO in respect of Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Ghana – which was held to demonstrate that in order to increase sales, persons who  performed services for and on behalf of Airbus offered, promised or gave  financial advantages to others intending to obtain or retain business, or an  advantage in the conduct of business, for Airbus. And that, those financial  advantages were intended to reward such improper performance. And further  that, Airbus did not prevent, or have in place at the material times adequate  procedures designed to prevent those persons associated with Airbus from  carrying out such conduct. 

4.5 In respect of Ghana, Airbus was charged with the offence of failure of a  commercial organisation to prevent bribery, contrary to section 7 of the Bribery  Act 2010. The particulars of offence stated that between 1 July 2011 and 1 June  2015, Airbus failed to prevent persons associated with Airbus from bribing  others concerned with the purchase of military transport aircraft by the  Government of Ghana, where the said bribery was intended to obtain or retain  business or advantage in the conduct of business for Airbus. 

4.6 The accompanying statement of facts summarised the SFO’s position that  between 2009 and 2015, an Airbus defence company engaged Intermediary 5 (who had no experience in the aviation sector), a national of the UK born in  Ghana and close relative of a high-ranking elected Ghanaian Government  official (Government Official 1), as its Business Partner in respect of the  proposed sale of three aircraft to the Government of Ghana. A number of  Airbus employees knew that Intermediary 5 was a close relative of Government 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

Official 1, a key decision maker in respect of the sales. A number of Airbus  employees made or promised success-based commission payments of  approximately five million Euros to Intermediary 5. False documentation was  created by or with the agreement of Airbus employees in order to support and  disguise these payments. The payments were intended to induce or reward  improper favour by Government Official 1 toward Airbus. 

4.7 Intermediary 5 was assisted in his work for Airbus by two other nationals of the  UK – Intermediary 6 (a friend of Intermediary 5 and a UK television actor and  film director) and Intermediary 7 (a former UK television actor). Contact  between Airbus and the Government of Ghana about aircraft sales began in June  2009 following an expression of interest by the Government of Ghana. By  August 2009, Airbus employee 15 [senior] reported that he was in contact with  Government Official 1 and his team. 

4.8 On 7 December 2009, Intermediaries 5 and 6 incorporated a company  (Company D) in Ghana. A company of the same name was incorporated in the  UK in February 2010. Company D was the corporate vehicle through which  Intermediary 5 and his associates provided services to Airbus. 

4.9 In December 2010, Airbus employee 16 was made aware that Intermediaries 5  and 6 were or had recently been working for Government Official 1 and/or the  Government of Ghana. 

4.10 The Airbus campaigns in Ghana culminated in the sale of three C-295 military  transport aircraft by Airbus to the Government of Ghana.  

4.11 In respect of the first campaign for two C-295s, Airbus paid 3,909,756 Euros to  a third-party company, Intermediary 8 between March 2012 and February 2014.  Intermediary 8 in turn paid 3,850,115.85 Euros to Company D. In respect of the  second campaign for the sale of one C-295, Intermediary 5 or Company D were  promised approximately 1,675,000 Euros. The promised amount was not paid. 

4.12 From 2009, Intermediary 5 and his associates worked on the sales to the  Government of Ghana without any written consultant agreement. This included  liaison with Government Official 1 regarding the potential Airbus C-295 sale.  Intermediaries 5 and 6 submitted a report to Airbus which documented a January  2011 meeting in London attended by themselves, Government Official 1 and  Airbus at which the C-295 aircraft was agreed upon as the most suitable aircraft  for the needs of the Government of Ghana.

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

4.13 By April 2011, Airbus employee 16 reported to his colleagues that the deal was  close to being finalised. He then asked Intermediaries 5 and 6 to transmit a letter  to Government Official 1 and explain a possible delay. He also asked them to  secure meetings with the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance.  On 18 May 2011, Intermediary 6 emailed Airbus employee 16 stating that  Government Official I had taken the relevant financials to the Minister of  Finance and that Intermediaries 5 and 6 were planning to go to Ghana within  the next couple of weeks so they could oversee the project personally. 

4.14 Company D submitted a formal Business Partner application in May 2011. On  8 July 2011, Intermediary 6 sent Airbus employee 15 [senior] a [Company D]  update. He reported that he had just returned from Ghana “having had very  productive meetings with all parties, including [Government Official 1], the  [Ministry of Defence] and Minister of Finance.” The email stated that the C-295  sale was agreed at all levels, and was expected to clear Parliament by 14 July 2011,  and that Government Official I had expressed an interest in buying two more  C-295s. 

4.15 On 3 August 2011, Airbus’ Spanish Defence Subsidiary and the Government of  Ghana signed a purchase agreement for the sale of the two C-295 aircraft. The  following day Airbus employee 17 [senior] (Airbus Compliance) declared to the  Spanish export credit agency that no more than 3,001,718.15 Euros would be  paid to Business Partners in connection with this contract. Although no payment  had actually yet been made, this figure broadly reflected a 5% commission. The  same document also declared compliance with the Organisation for Economic  Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of  Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 

4.16 Following the May 2011 Business Partner application, Airbus commissioned an  external due diligence report on Company D. The resulting report dated 30  September 2011 identified Intermediary 5 as a shareholder of Company D and  the possibility that he was a close relative of Government Official I. The source  of the information was a UK newspaper article quoting Intermediary 6. 

4.17 The Airbus external due diligence report raised concerns that there was a risk of  non-conformity with the OECD Convention. 

4.18 Faced with this raised concerned and a stated fear that a failure of the Company  D application portended the prevention of Airbus from doing business in Ghana  for a number of years, relevant Airbus employees agreed to, and did substitute  Company D with a Spanish company (Intermediary 8), which was a pre-existing  Airbus Business Partner, by deliberately circumventing the proper compliance 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

process by falsely representing that the work in respect of the first campaign had  been done by Intermediary 8 – who could in turn then make the money available  to Intermediary 5 and others. 

4.19 On 19 March 2012, Airbus employee 1 [senior] and Airbus employee 22 [senior]  approved the Intermediary 8 Business Partner application for the first campaign.  The consultant agreement between Intermediary 8 and Airbus was dated 20  March 2012 and with an effective date of 1 January 2010. The agreement  provided for a percentage commission fee of the net total amount received by  Airbus by virtue of any commercial contract with the Government of Ghana for  C-295 aircraft.  

4.20 As indicated above, between March 2012 and February 2014, Airbus paid  3,909,756.85 Euros to Intermediary 8, which in turn paid 3,850,115 Euros to  Company D, and retained about 60,000 Euros. 

4.21 By the time of the second campaign, the March 2012 Intermediary 8 consultant  agreement had expired. A request on 24 February 2014 by Airbus employee 21  [senior] and Airbus employee 15 [senior] for the extension of the expired  agreement was refused on 19 March 2014 by Airbus employee 20, who advised  that a new agreement would have to be signed. 

4.22 Extensive discussions via email were held by relevant Airbus employees and  Intermediary 5 on the urgency to carry the deal forward since it had stalled.  Government Official 1 was blind copied in some of the emails from the relevant  Airbus employees to Intermediary 5. Intermediary 5 assured Airbus employee 16  on 14 October 2014 that he had spoken with Government Official 1 who had  expressed that there would be movement on the transaction. 

4.23 A draft Business Partner application in the name of Intermediary 8 was created  in February 2015 and a request for payment presented to the Airbus Liquidation  Committee in April 2015. However, the Liquidation Committee requested  further due diligence before payment could be concluded. Intermediary 8  declined to participate in an interview and accordingly failed the due diligence. 

4.24 Airbus did not enter into a written contract or make any commission payment in respect of the second campaign. Correspondence from Intermediary 5 to  Airbus claimed that he was owed 1,675,000 Euros. Airbus disputed the claim by  Intermediary 5. No proceedings have been instituted by Intermediary 5 or  Company D.

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

4.25 The UK authorities and Airbus agreed on the foregoing as established facts. In  brief, Airbus failed to prevent persons associated with it from bribing others  concerned with the purchase of military transport aircraft by the Government  of Ghana, where the said bribery was intended to obtain or retain business or  advantage in the conduct of business for Airbus. And that, a number of Airbus  employees agreed to deliberately circumvent the proper compliance process by  falsely representing that the work in the first campaign had been done by  Intermediary 8, which could, in turn, make the money available to Intermediary  5 and others. Further, the sum paid to Intermediary 8 by Airbus, and then by  Intermediary 8 to Intermediary 5 exceed (in the latter case by about 850,000 Euros) the agreed commission amount set out in the declaration of compliance  by Airbus to the Spanish export credit agency. 

United States 

4.26 It is also well-known that on 31 January 2020, the United States District Court  for the District of Columbia, reached similar conclusions by way of a Deferred  Prosecution Agreement (DPA)/Consent Agreement (CA) in the case of United  States of America v. Airbus. 

4.27 In relation to Ghana, the DPA posited that Airbus willfully concealed its political  contributions, fees and commissions paid to business partners in conjunction  with the sale or transfer of defence articles and defence services in violation of  ITAR. This was because certain ITAR-controlled defence articles from US  suppliers were component parts of the C-295. These components were exported  from the US to Spain for the manufacture of the C-295. And that Airbus  repeatedly filed re-export license applications with the US authorities relating to  C-295s that included false or incomplete certifications related to ITAR Part 130,  as well as re-export license applications that failed to include any certifications  about ITAR 130. 

4.28 The DPA stated that between 2009 and 2016, Individual 1, a citizen of Ghana,  was a high-ranking elected government official in Ghana during the relevant  ITAR time period. Beginning in or around 2009, a few months after Individual  1 took office, Individual 1 was in direct and repeated contact with senior Airbus  executives from both the Defence & Space Division and SMO International 

(one of Airbus entities responsible for reviewing the use of Business Partners  and payments to third parties) about Airbus sales campaigns. Individual 1 was  influential in having the Government of Ghana approve aircraft purchases, and  Individual 1 contacted Airbus senior executives during the government approval  process. In 2011, during Individual 1’s time in office, the Ghanaian Parliament  approved the purchase of two C-295 aircraft.

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

4.29 In Connection with the sales to Ghana, beginning on or about 1 January 2009,  the Defence & Space Division’s Spanish subsidiary contracted with Individual  1’s brother, Consultant 4, a citizen of Ghana and the UK, to act as a third-party  consultant for Airbus during the C-295 sales campaigns. Airbus purposefully  sought to engage Consultant 4 due to his closeness to Individual 1, and Airbus  management included Consultant 4 in their communications with Individual 1.  Airbus used Consultant 4 as a conduit for messages intended for Individual 1,  and Consultant 4 traded on his access to Individual 1. 

4.30 Consultant 5, a citizen of the UK, worked in conjunction with Consultant 4 to  assist in the sale. Consultant 4 and Consultant 5 initially were engaged by Airbus  without any written business partner agreement and without Airbus completing  due diligence. 

4.31 Airbus initially agreed to pay Consultant 4 through a company owned by  Consultant 4 and Consultant 5, in excess of 3.5 million Euros. Airbus worked  with Consultant 4 and Consultant 5 for two years before submitting a business  partner application to Airbus compliance staff. 

4.32 In October 2011, Airbus compliance staff rejected the proposed contract  between Airbus and Consultant 4 and Consultant 5’s company because  Consultant 4 had a familial relationship to Individual 1. Specifically, Airbus  compliance staff found that “the shareholders of this company are so close to  the decision makers”. 

4.33 Thereafter, due to the scrutiny of using Consultant 4 as a business partner, senior  leadership in SMO International and the Defence & Space Division concocted  a plan to deliberately circumvent Airbus compliance rules. Specifically, the  Airbus executives proposed to pay Consultant 4 via Organisation 1, a Spanish 

based third-party business partner of Airbus previously used on other Defence  & Space Division campaigns. Organisation 1 was in good standing with SMO  International. However, it had no prior affiliation with Consultant 4 or  Consultant 5. Airbus used Organisation 1 solely as a pass-through entity to  obscure the involvement of Consultant 4 in sales transactions. Organisation 1  did not undertake any third-party business partner activity in Ghana in  connection with the 2011 campaign to sell two C-295s to the Government of  Ghana. 

4.34 Under this scheme, on 20 March 2012, Airbus entered into a contract with  Organisation 1 to provide business partner services to the C-295 Ghana  campaign. Although the agreement was signed on 20 March 2021, it stated that  the effective date for the contract was 1 January 2010. The agreement was signed 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

by Airbus Defence & Space management and it noted that Organisation 1’s  “operational address” was in Ghana, despite the fact that Organisation 1 was  operating in Spain. Under the agreement, Organisation 1 would be provided a  success fee for the C-295 aircraft sale. The success fee was calculated to be  approximately 3,001,718 Euros, a similar amount to that previously promised to  Consultant 4 (3,500,000 Euros). 

4.35 Pursuant to the agreement, between March 2012 and February 2014, Airbus paid  in excess of 3,500,000 Euros to Organisation 1 in Spain. The payments were  authorised by SMO International. 

4.36 Thereafter, Organisation 1 transferred money to the account of the company  owned by Consultant 4 and Consultant 5. Organisation 1 took a percentage of  the money prior to the transfer. In total, the company owned by Consultant 4  and Consultant 5 was paid in excess of 1,800,000 Euros in May 2012, related to  the 2011 sale of two C-295s. Consultant 4 later claimed 71,393 Euros was still  owed to him related to this sale. 

4.37 In February 2014, Airbus management at SMO International and the Defence  & Space Division sought to extend Airbus’ contract with Organisation 1, related  to a subsequent campaign to sell C-295 aircraft to Ghana. Airbus compliance  staff rejected the extension request and required that a new contract be signed.  In March 2015, a request was submitted for Organisation 1 to be paid 1,665,000  Euros for the 2015 sale of one C-295 aircraft to Ghana. Consultant 4  subsequently demanded from both Airbus and Organisation 1 payment of  1,675,000 Euros in connection with the 2015 C-295 sale. 

4.38 Additionally, on or about 28 March 2012, Airbus made political contributions in  the amount of 62,200 Euros to a Spanish foundation related to agricultural  development in Ghana. This contribution was not initially disclosed to the US  authorities. Airbus subsequently disclosed it out of abundance of caution. No  direct link between the political contributions and the relevant C-295 sales has  been identified to date. 

4.39 Airbus admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was responsible under US  law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees and agents as charged in the  DPA, and that the allegations described in the DPA are true and accurate.  

4.40 Airbus also accepted that the facts were established beyond reasonable doubt,  and that the facts took place during the relevant time frame.

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

5.0 OSP Investigation 

5.1 Notwithstanding the definitive pronouncements by the UK and the US courts  on the accepted culpability of Airbus, beyond reasonable doubt, for bribery in  relation to the sale to Ghana of C-295 aircraft, it was imperative that criminal investigations be carried out by relevant Ghanaian authorities for several reasons. 

5.2 First, the relevant investigative authorities in Ghana did not participate in the  investigation in relation to the acts that refer to Ghana. The President’s 2  February 2020 referral to the OSP is testament that Ghana officially became  aware of the global investigation into the conduct of Airbus by the SFO, the  DOJ, the DOS, and the PNF after the fact and after the coordinated 31 January  2020 judicial pronouncements. 

5.3 Also, the UK and US judicial decisions only establish criminal culpability in the  context of the laws of the two jurisdictions. It does not automatically follow that  the acts accepted as proved beyond reasonable doubt in those jurisdictions  amount to criminal offences in the reckoning of Ghanaian law. To rely solely on  the UK and US decisions, without more, as proof of criminal culpability, would  be akin to seeking to enforce the criminal laws of the UK and US in Ghana – which is impermissible. Therefore, the UK and US court decisions cannot of  themselves be the only index of proof of criminality in Ghana. That is to say, the  Republic cannot hope to successfully mount criminal prosecutions solely on the  back of the two foreign court decisions. It has to be shown, beyond reasonable  doubt, that the acts amount to criminal offences in Ghana. 

5.4 Then again, the above detailed account of the outcome of the investigations and  court decisions in the UK and US shows that the DPAs did not include and  cover the referenced individuals. The agreed settlements were reached by the  UK and US authorities with Airbus only. Indeed, the UK court stated in  paragraph 6 of its decision that “DPAs provided a mechanism by which an  organisation (being a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated  association, but not an individual) can avoid prosecution for certain economic  offences through an agreement with the prosecuting authority.” Similarly, the  US DPA regime provides no protection against prosecution of any individual,  regardless of their affiliation with Airbus.  

5.5 On this score, it seems that Airbus accepted criminal culpability for bribery for  itself and also vicariously on behalf of the referenced individuals, including its  employees, agents, business partners, and Ghanaian officials. And that the  referenced individuals appeared not to have been direct subjects of the  investigations by the UK and US authorities and were not afforded the 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

opportunity, if they were so minded to take it, to explain their actions and to  present exculpatory evidence, if any. 

5.6 Further, it is obvious that the identity of the referenced individuals was not  disclosed in both the UK and US outcomes and court decisions. The UK court  explained in paragraph 13 of its decision that there were ongoing investigations  in respect of a number of individual suspects in the UK and outside the UK.  Thus, it was appropriate to protect the rights of the suspects to a fair trial. In  addition, some of the individuals involved in the relevant conduct were based in  jurisdictions where there were human rights concerns, and the death penalty  existed for corruption. Further, the intermediary companies used by Airbus were  often made up of a few individuals. Naming the companies would therefore be  tantamount to naming those individuals. Consequently, it was prudent not to  prejudice potential criminal proceedings and revelation that could potentially  lead to action or the imposition of a penalty which would be regarded as  contravening Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which  prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 

5.7 Therefore, it is compelling that investigations be carried out by relevant  Ghanaian authorities to ascertain the identity of the referenced individuals as  direct subjects of the investigation for closer scrutiny of their actions, and to  determine whether the acts committed in Ghana amount to criminal offences in  Ghana; and whether the acts committed outside Ghana would amount to  criminal offences in Ghana, if committed in Ghana. 

5.8 Ergo, the Special Prosecutor, upon determining that allegations of bribery are  within the mandate of the OSP, and that the referral and the judgments of the  UK and US courts raised reasonable suspicion of the commission of corruption  and corruption-related offences of bribery of public officers and the use of  public office by public officers for private profit, authorised the commencement  of preliminary investigation into the matter in accordance with regulation 5(1)(b)  and subsequently, a full investigation under regulations 5(1)(c) and 6 of the  Office of the Special Prosecutor (Operations) Regulations, 2018 (L.I. 2374).  

5.9 The investigation was commenced in February 2020 and concluded in June 2024.  The investigation focused on the individual described as Government Official 1  by the UK court and Individual 1 by the US court; the individual described as  Intermediary 5 by the UK court and Consultant 4 by the US court; the individual  described as Intermediary 6 by the UK court and Consultant 5 by the US court;  the individual described as Intermediary 7 by the UK court; the company  described as Company D by the UK court and by the US court as the Company  owned by Consultant 4 and Consultant 5; another individual associated with the

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

individual described as Intermediary 5 by the UK court and Consultant 4 by the  US court; other individuals who are Ghanaian public officials and politically  exposed persons.  

5.10 On 7 February 2020, the Special Prosecutor triggered the mutual legal assistance  process under the Mutual Legal Assistance Act, 2010 (Act 807), which governs  mutual legal assistance in respect of criminal matters under an agreement or  other arrangement between Ghana and a foreign state or foreign entity. The  Special Prosecutor’s request, channeled through the Central Authority under Act  807 for onward transmission to relevant authorities in the UK and US (in  particular the SFO and the DOJ), was designed to obtain admissible evidence  relating to the allegations of bribery of Ghanaian officials in the C-295 aircraft  purchase from Airbus, and the establishment of whether any proceeds of the  corruption and corruption-related offences were transferred to Ghanaian  officials. The mutual legal assistance process continued well into 2023. The UK  authorities paused the process between 10 February 2021 and 20 December 2021  pending the outcome of an ongoing UK investigation.  

5.11 The OSP established, through independent enquiry, the identity of the subjects  of the investigation. We deem it necessary to reveal the identity of some of the  individuals owing to the very heightened public interest in the fact that the  conduct of Airbus was held by the UK and US courts to be aimed at courting  undue favour and advantage from Ghanaian public officials and an elected high  Government official in the sale of C-295 aircraft to Ghana and the persons held  to be closely associated with or the conduit of the courting of such undue favour and advantage; and also in light of the occurrences in the context of the  investigative and prosecutorial actions of Ghanaian and UK authorities in the 

past four and a half years. 

5.12 The OSP confirms the identity of the following individuals:  Government Official 1/Individual 1 

The individual described as Government Official 1 by the UK court and  Individual 1 by the US court is John Dramani Mahama. He is a citizen of  Ghana. He was the Vice President of Ghana from 7 January 2009 to 24 July  2012. He was the President of Ghana from 24 July 2012 to 7 January 2017. His  tenure of office as the Vice President of Ghana coincided with the time frame  of UK and US investigation of the first Airbus campaign for the sale of two C 

295 aircraft to Ghana. His term as the President of Ghana occurred during the  UK and US investigation time frame of the second Airbus campaign for the sale  of one C-295 aircraft to Ghana.

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

Intermediary 5/Consultant 4  

The individual described as Intermediary 5 by the UK court and Consultant 4 by  the US court is known both as Samuel Adam Mahama and Samuel Adam  Foster. He is a UK citizen and a citizen of Ghana. He is a younger brother of  the full blood of John Dramani Mahama, a former President of Ghana (referred  to above). His birth name is Samuel Adam Mahama. He was adopted from  Ghana and taken to the UK in 1972 by a British missionary couple. He assumed  the last name of his adopted parents – Foster, at age 9. He lost touch with his  Ghanaian family until 1997.  

Intermediary 6/Consultant 5  

The individual described as Intermediary 6 by the UK court and Consultant 5 by  the US court is Philip Sean Middlemiss. He is a UK citizen. He is an English  television and radio actor and businessman. He is a close friend of Samuel Adam  Foster (referred to above). 

Intermediary 7  

The individual described as Intermediary 7 by the UK court is Leanne Sarah  Davis. She is a UK citizen. She is a partner to Philip Sean Middlemiss (referred  to above). 

5.13 On 30 April 2020, the OSP requested the assistance of INTERPOL for the  issuance of a Red Notice for the apprehension of Samuel Adam Foster, Philip  Sean Middlemiss, Leanne Sarah Davis, and Sarah Furneaux (the spouse of  Samuel Adam Foster). The Red Notice was published by INTERPOL on 10 July  2020. 

5.14 On 13 May 2020, the OSP sought and obtained warrants from the Circuit Accra,  Accra for the arrest of Samuel Adam Foster, Philip Sean Middlemiss, Leanne  Sarah Davis, and Sarah Furneaux. 

5.15 In the general scheme of affairs, the INTERPOL Red Notice, by itself, is not an  arrest warrant, and it is insufficient to secure the presence in Ghana of the non resident subjects of the investigation, without an accompanying request for  extradition. The OSP is not the body mandated by law to request the extradition  of suspects from foreign jurisdictions to the Republic. Thus, it could only rely  on the agencies mandated by law so to do. 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

5.16 In July 2020, the OSP sought, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and  Regional Integration and the Ghana High Commission in the UK, the voluntary  return to Ghana of Samuel Adam Foster for interviewing by the OSP, since he  is a citizen of Ghana, apart from being a citizen of the UK. The efforts were  unsuccessful.  

5.17 There was a pause in the investigation between November 2020 and July 2021. The investigation resumed in August 2021. By July 2022, it had become obvious  that the mutual legal assistance process was yielding precious little. 

5.18 The OSP interviewed former President John Dramani Mahama on 5 January  2024 in Accra. On its own, the OSP located and interviewed Samuel Adam  Foster, Philip Sean Middlemiss, Leanne Sarah Davis, and Sarah Furneaux outside  Ghana in March 2024, in the presence of their counsel. 

5.19 Former President Mahama intimated that he had had the opportunity to publicly  respond to the allegations against him of bribery by Airbus through  intermediaries in respect of the purchase by Ghana of C-295 aircraft from  Airbus. However, he welcomed the OSP’s interview.  

5.20 He recounted that to the best of his recollection, the procurement of new aircraft for the Ghana Air Force began in August 2008 under the tenure of former  President John Agyekum Kufuor, when the Air Force decided to replace its  Fokker F-27 medium lift aircraft with C-27J Spartan aircraft. At the time, the  project was to be executed under the Foreign Military Sales of the United States  with the expectation that the United States would assist Ghana with a grant or  loan to purchase the aircraft and provide pilot training and logistics support. The  final decision was to purchase four aircraft. Thereafter, a framework contract  was developed, followed by inspection visits by the Ghana side and negotiations  among the Air Force Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance,  Attorney-General’s Department, and representatives of the US Government,  toward the purchase of the aircraft. 

5.21 Former President Mahama stated that on or about 14 April 2009, during the  presidency of former President John Evans Atta Mills, the Air Force submitted  a proposal to the Government of Ghana designed to replace all the ageing Air  Force transport fleet comprising the Fokker F-27, BN-2 (Defender), and the  Skyvan. Following a comparative analysis of various aircraft, a recommendation  was made to the effect that the United States Government should be engaged to  facilitate the acquisition of the C-27J Spartan aircraft. However, as it turned out,  the year 2012 initially agreed for the delivery of the aircraft was impractical, and  the purchase price had increased substantially.

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

5.22 Consequently, the Air Force was constrained to consider other options. After a  selection review, it opted for the CASA C-295 aircraft from Airbus because it  met its operational requirements at a much cheaper cost. Equally important,  delivery of the aircraft was guaranteed for the end of 2011. The Air Force  accordingly wrote to the Minister for Defence on its choice.  

5.23 In the reckoning of former President Mahama, the decision to acquire the C 295s was taken professionally by the Ghana Air Force and the Military  Command, in general, in the best interest of Ghana, and in broad consultation  with relevant state institutions including the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of  Defence, and ultimately, Parliamentary approval. Therefore, any suggestion that  he had corruptly or improperly influenced in any way the process of acquisition  is simply fanciful and untrue.  

5.24 Former President Mahama opined that he believed the allegations of corruption  levelled against him stemmed from the fact that Samuel Adam Foster, his  brother, was involved in Airbus activities in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa at  the time, and the suspicion was always that because of that familial relationship,  Foster might have been a corrupting source for influencing Government’s  decision to award the supply contract to Airbus. Former President Mahama  stated that he had no hand whatsoever in the establishment of any relationship  (formal or otherwise), which Foster had with Airbus.  

5.25 Former President Mahama admitted that during his term as Vice President of  the Republic, he met with officials of Airbus sometime in February or March  2011 on an official trip to London – where the Airbus team made a  representation to Government on their products, including helicopters. He  stated that it was a formal meeting attended also by the Minister of Finance,  representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Commander of the Ghana  Air Force.  

5.26 Former President Mahama also admitted that he subsequently met one or other  Airbus official in his office a couple of times in connection with the sale of the  aircraft. He described the meetings as being invariably official engagements with  one or other responsible state official present – the purpose of which was to  discuss progress of the proposed sale of aircraft. 

5.27 Former President Mahama further stated he never received any bribe or  inducement or gained any personal benefit or advantage from the procurement  of the aircraft for Ghana. And that Airbus did not make any such allegation  against him.

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

5.28 On his part, Samuel Adam Foster stated that he unequivocally denied the  accusations against him that he was involved in any bribery activities with  Ghanaian public officials or any individuals on behalf of Airbus. He recounted  that from late 2009 to approximately 2015/16, he served legitimately as a  consultant and business partner for Airbus, contributing across all its sectors, 

encompassing projects in Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, and Suriname as  required by Airbus. 

5.29 Foster illustrated that in the aftermath of the tragic Kenyan police Eurocopter  AS350 helicopter crash on 10 June 2012, Airbus (the manufacturer) was  becoming estranged from the Kenyan authorities. A directive by a Senior Vice  President of Airbus, ****-******** ******, assigned Foster and his team the  mission of repairing high-level relations with the Kenyan Government. The  campaign led to a restoration of Airbus’ relationship with the Kenyan authorities. 

Foster opined that after performing all these services for Airbus, it was unfair to  portray him falsely as a facilitator of bribes. And that the misrepresentation of  his contributions and the failure to recognise the lawful nature of his activities  have resulted in unwarranted allegations of corruption.  

5.30 Foster contended that contrary to the assertion that he lacked relevant aviation  experience, he obtained a Private Pilot’s License in South Africa in 2000. And  that, in any case, Airbus’ criteria for business partners did not require  aeronautical experience. Further, he stated that his engagement with Airbus was  not predicated on family connections but on a genuine interest and  understanding of the aviation sector.  

5.31 Foster stated that his engagement by Airbus was based on a success-based  commission model, which is standard within the industry and entirely contingent  on the successful finalisation of deals. And that this distinguished his work a  world away from a regime of inducive payments to secure business.  

5.32 Philip Sean Middlemiss stated that he unequivocally denied the accusations that  he was involved in bribery activities with Ghanaian public officials or any  individuals on behalf of Airbus. He contended that from late 2009 to  approximately 2012, he served legitimately and in good faith as a consultant and  business partner for Airbus. And that his primary role was to assist and facilitate  in the completion of the sale and purchase of the aircraft which had already been  selected and approved by the relevant government authorities and agencies  before the involvement of him and his colleagues. 

5.33 Middlemiss stated that the narrative suggested by Airbus and subsequently  recorded in the DPAs inaccurately portrayed him as a conduit for bribery and 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

grossly distorted the reality of his involvement. He argued that he worked on an  industry standard success-based commission. And that remuneration due to him  was invoiced by and paid into Company D or the Company owned by  Consultant 4 and Consultant 5, of which he was a shareholder.  

5.34 Leanne Sarah Davis stated that she was never involved, either professionally or  personally, with Airbus or any individual connected to Airbus, whether in  Ghana, the UK, or Europe. She declared that she categorically denied any  accusations of misconduct.  

5.35 Davis recounted that she was appointed the Company Secretary of Company D or the Company owned by Consultant 4 and Consultant 5 on 10 February 2010  until its dissolution on 20 September 2011. She stated that she was never  employed by Airbus. Her name did not appear in Airbus-related email  communications, statements or facts, or within the DPA. Further, she stated that  she was never questioned about the Airbus case nor received any  correspondence from the UK, US, French or Ghanaian authorities regarding  alleged bribery linked to Airbus. 

5.36 On Sarah Furneaux’s part she stated that she wondered why she became a  subject of the OSP investigation since she merely served as a silent director for  a company which was not the focus of the Airbus investigation in the UK, US,  or France. She denied any allegations of wrongdoing and she stated that she had  never been involved with Airbus. 

6.0 Observations 

6.1 The OSP’s mutual legal assistance requested from the UK and US authorities  placed the OSP in a position no better than any person who read the DPAs and  the decisions of the UK and US courts on the Airbus matter. It was not a lack  of industry or want of trying on the part of the OSP. In the end, the OSP  conducted the investigation on its own. However, the DPAs and the decisions  of the UK and UK courts served as a vital foundation for the OSP investigation. 

Afterall, the President’s referral to the OSP was on the back of the DPAs and  the judicial pronouncements. Therefore, the OSP investigative outcomes are  substantially similar to that of the SFO and the DOJ. 

6.2 The OSP investigation shows, as captured in the UK and US DPAs, that Airbus  completed two sale campaigns in Ghana in respect of C-295 twin-turboprop  military transport aircraft manufactured in Spain by a subsidiary of Airbus. The  campaigns resulted in the sale of three C-295s. The first contract between Ghana 

17 

OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

and Airbus was signed on 3 August 2011 for the sale of two of the aircraft and  the second contract was signed on 5 March 2015 for one C-295. The three  aircraft were delivered to Ghana on 17 November 2011, 19 March 2012, and 4  December 2015, respectively. 

6.3 The OSP investigation shows that, in the general scheme of affairs, the  acquisition of operational assets by the Air Force is driven by national and  operational requirements. When a need is identified, the Air Force Command  develops a technical paper upon which providers are requested to make  presentations on technical details, logistics support and cost. If a provider meets  the requirements, a formal contract in the form of a sales and purchase  agreement are drafted by the provider for the consideration of the Air Force.  Thereafter, stakeholder meetings are held among representatives of the Air  Force, Attorney-General’s Department, Department of Legal Services of the  Ministry of Defence, the Judge Advocate General’s office, and the provider – aimed at arriving at a consensus on outstanding issues and conflicting positions  and resulting amendments to the draft agreement. Thereafter, the agreement is  submitted to the Ministry of Defence for Cabinet and Parliamentary approvals. 

The Air Force then constitutes a compliance team to work closely with the  provider to ensure that the delivered item meets the agreed specifications. 

6.4 The processes leading to the purchase by the Government of Ghana of three C 295 twin-turboprop military transport aircraft from Airbus followed  substantially the same pattern. Parliament approved the proposed transactions  in 2011. In accordance with the laws of Ghana, there was nothing remarkable  about the deal and it certainly would not have found its way in the UK and US  DPAs and made headlines around the world but for the involvement of former  President John Dramani Mahama and his younger brother of the full blood,  Samuel Adam Foster (also known as Samuel Adam Mahama) and his associates,  as recounted in the UK and US DPAs. 

6.5 The OSP investigation found no evidence that former President Mahama was  involved or played any role in the procurement and maintenance of the agency  relationship between Airbus and Foster and his associates in respect of the  purchase by the Government of Ghana of military transport aircraft from  Airbus. And it appears to the OSP that the direct communications and meetings  between former President Mahama and officials of Airbus to close the deal were  actuated by good intentions on the part of the former. 

6.6 It also appears that Foster and his associates became involved as intermediaries  in the Airbus-Ghana deal after the decision by the Government of Ghana in  preference of the C-295 aircraft. Therefore, it seems that Foster’s Airbus 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

intermediary role at the time his brother served as the Vice President of Ghana  was a case of luckless coincidence that attracted the disapproval of the UK and  US authorities.  

6.7 The OSP found no evidence that suggests that the involvement of Foster as an  intermediary of Airbus and the direct communications and meetings between  former President Mahama and officials of Airbus to close the deal between  Airbus and the Government of Ghana amounted to any corruption and  corruption-related offence in respect of which the OSP has a mandate. 

6.8 However, it ought reasonably to have occurred to former President Mahama and  the Government of Ghana that the familial relationship between former  President Mahama and Foster and the direct participation by former President  Mahama in the communications and meetings with Airbus officials were bound  to raise reasonable suspicions of improper conduct and dealings notwithstanding  any claims to good faith conduct and above board dealings, especially in light of  the fact that during the first Airbus campaign former President Mahama was the  Chairman of the Armed Forces Council by reason of his position as the Vice  President – and therefore a key decision-maker.  

6.9 Such close proximity dealings by such elected high officials of the Republic and  their kin and close associates on behalf of the Republic should neither be viewed  favourably nor encouraged – as they give rise to reasonable suspicion of  influence peddling and conflict of interest. Never mind any intended good faith.  

6.10 Then again, the direct participation of the President and the Vice President (on  behalf of the Republic) in commercial communications and meetings with  commercial entities should not be encouraged either – as they expose these  elected high officials to the spectre of the slightest hint of perceived corruption  that may attend international business transactions. The President and Vice  President should be insulated from such direct commercial dealings. 

6.11 Indeed, it seems to the OSP that the only reasons why the Airbus-Ghana deal  found its way into the UK and US DPAs were the fact that former President  Mahama and Samuel Adam Foster were brothers of the full blood; and that former President Mahama directly participated in commercial communications  and meetings with Airbus officials. 

6.12 This is because – without seeking to critique the UK and US DPAs – the OSP  found no evidence, circumstantial or direct, which suggests that Foster and his  associates were actually paid bribes and which bribes were to be transmitted to 

19 

OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

former President Mahama and that the bribes were actually paid to former  President Mahama. 

6.13 Indeed, to all intents and purposes and objectively viewed, an agency relationship  existed between Airbus and Foster and his associates by which Foster and his  associates acted as business partners of Airbus in respect of the Airbus-Ghana  deal, and under which Foster and his associates were to be remunerated success 

based commission payments. This was a typical arrangement instituted by  Airbus, by which it contracted third parties as business partners to increase its  international footprint and to assist it in winning sales contracts in numerous  jurisdictions. On this basis, when Airbus made a successful sale of aircraft, it  would ordinarily pay a business partner a commission-based percentage value of  the sale, or a fixed amount of the aircraft. 

6.14 In this context, Airbus took the benefit of the agency arrangement with Foster  and his associates and the services they provided to Airbus for a considerable  length of time. This was so because the contract for the sale of the first two C 295s between Airbus and Ghana (which was clearly secured by Foster and his  associates) was signed almost two months before Airbus issued its due diligence  report on 30 September 2011, which led to the abrogation of the arrangement  between Airbus and Foster and his associates.  

6.15 It was only when the Airbus due diligence mechanism discovered the familial  relationship between former President Mahama and Foster that it abrogated the  relationship. The abrogation by Airbus of the agency arrangement certainly  portended to work, and it did work, grave unfairness against Foster and his  associates. Thus, the concoction of a plan by senior leadership in SMO  International and the Defence & Space Division to deliberately circumvent  Airbus compliance rules by substituting Company D or the company owned by  Consultant 4 and Consultant 5 with the Spanish Intermediary 8 or Organisation  1 to ensure payments to Foster and his associates was probably a well intentioned adventure, though apparently misguided – as it rendered the  payments seemingly of doubtful provenance. 

6.16 It also appears to the OSP that the relationship between Airbus and Foster and  his associates was neither one-off nor peculiar to the Airbus-Ghana deal. Airbus  had in place similar business partnership models with Foster and his associates  in respect of business promotion in other African countries before the Airbus 

Ghana transaction. 

6.17 As we stated above, the UK and US DPAs did not include and cover the  referenced individuals. The agreed settlements were reached by the UK and US 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

authorities with Airbus only. And it appears that Airbus accepted criminal  culpability for bribery for itself and also vicariously on behalf of the referenced  individuals, including its employees, agents, business partners, and Ghanaian public officials. And that the referenced individuals appeared not to have been  direct subjects of the investigations by the UK and US authorities and were not  afforded the opportunity, if they were so minded to take it, to explain their  actions and to present exculpatory evidence, if any.  

6.18 The OSP is unaware of any such analogous proceedings or framework in Ghana  by which an entity could vicariously accept wholesale criminal responsibility on  behalf of another, especially where that other was not a direct subject of the  investigation and was available to answer for himself but was not afforded the  opportunity to do so and to present any exculpatory evidence he may have. 

6.19 Though the UK DPA and the US DPA were emphatic that Airbus failed to  prevent persons associated with it from bribing others concerned with the  purchase of military transport aircraft by the Government of Ghana; and that  the bribes were intended to obtain or retain business or advantage in the conduct  of business for Airbus; and further that the payments were intended to induce  or reward improper favour by former President John Dramani Mahama toward  Airbus – the conclusions by the UK and US authorities appear to be solely from  the perspective of Airbus and what Airbus perceived as the real intentions of its  employees in their dealings with their intermediaries and the Government of  Ghana.  

6.20 The OSP does not question the conclusions of the UK and US authorities. This  is so, especially as the OSP is not privy to the raw body of evidence available to  the UK and US authorities, apart from the content of the DPAs. However, it  seems to us that the nature and structure of Ghana’s statutory prohibitions and  our jurisprudence on corruption and corruption-related offences do not lend  themselves to founding criminal culpability in respect of the referenced  individuals in the context of the UK and US outcomes. 

6.21 It seems to us that since the referenced individuals were not represented during  the UK and US investigations, it became a case of whatever characterisation  Airbus placed on their conduct in relation to the actions of the employees of  Airbus. It is also obvious that Airbus did not represent and had no intention of  representing the interest of the referenced individuals. It appears to us that the  sole aim of Airbus was to save its image and reputation, never mind what it did  to the image and reputation of the referenced individuals – and to pay fines to  avoid prosecution.

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

6.22 Therefore, by reconstructing the entirety of Airbus’ dealings in Ghana and  through its intermediaries and with Ghanaian public officials from both the  perspective of the officials of Airbus and that of the Airbus intermediaries and  Ghanaian public officials, it seems to the OSP that what Airbus perceived and  accepted in the DPAs as the real intentions of its employees in their dealings  with the intermediaries and Ghanaian public officials is at cross purposes with  what appeared to be the real intentions and expectations of the intermediaries  and Ghanaian public officials in their dealings with the employees of Airbus. 

6.23 That is to say, while the accepted facts in the two foreign jurisdictions are that  the employees of Airbus designed the payments to the intermediaries as bribes  intended to court favour with Ghanaian public officials, the intermediaries, on  the other hand, appeared to expect and received the payments as their legitimate  expectation under an arrangement of success-based commissions for the sale of  the military transport aircraft to the Government of Ghana. And their actions  (in whichever way viewed) were calculated as businessmen expecting their lawful paychecks and not as conduits of a bribery scheme. 

6.24 The concoction of a plan by senior leadership in SMO International and the  Defence & Space Division to deliberately circumvent Airbus compliance rules by substituting Company D or the company owned by Consultant 4 and  Consultant 5 with Spanish Intermediary 8 or Organisation 1 to ensure payments  to Foster and his associates, though wrongful and deceptive, was entirely an  internal matter for Airbus in respect of its disciplinary regulations and code of  ethics. It does not amount to the payment of bribes to court favour with  Ghanaian public officials in the reckoning of Ghanaian law. Neither does the  short declaration by Airbus to the Spanish export credit agency and Airbus’ non 

declaration in the context of US ITAR. 

6.25 Consequently, the OSP has no evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that  Samuel Adam Foster (also known as Samuel Adam Mahama), Philip Sean  Middlemiss, and Leanne Sarah Davis acted as conduits of bribery between the  employees of Airbus and former President John Dramani Mahama or any other  public official. 

6.26 Also, the OSP found no evidentiary basis that suggests that Samuel Adam Foster  (also known as Samuel Adam Mahama), Philip Sean Middlemiss, and Leanne  Sarah Davis received payments from Airbus with the intention of bribing former  President John Dramani Mahama or any other public official. 

6.27 Further, the OSP found no evidentiary basis that suggests that former President  John Dramani Mahama or any other public official was paid bribes by Samuel 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

Adam Foster (also known as Samuel Adam Mahama), Philip Sean Middlemiss,  and Leanne Sarah Davis in respect of the purchase by the Government of Ghana  of military transport aircraft from Airbus. 

6.28 Then again, the OSP found no evidentiary basis that suggests that former  President John Dramani Mahama or any other public official was induced to  improperly favour or did improperly favour Airbus in respect of the purchase by  the Government of Ghana of military transport aircraft from Airbus. 

6.29 Sarah Furneaux should not have been a subject of the OSP investigation. 

6.30 The OSP has cited and notes that by two separate communications, both dated  22 April 2021, the SFO notified Samuel Adam Foster and Philip Sean  Middlemiss as follows: 

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO AIRBUS S.E. AND OTHERS 

I write to notify you that, following a review of the evidence in your case and consideration  of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, a decision has been made that you are not to be  prosecuted for any offence in respect of the above Serious Fraud Office investigation. 

This decision might be reconsidered if: 

  • a further review of this decision shows that it was wrong and, in order to  maintain confidence in the criminal justice system, a prosecution should be  

brought; or  

  • new evidence comes to light. 

6.31 It has not come to the notice of the OSP that the SFO has reconsidered its  decision. 

7.0 Further Action 

7.1 The Special Prosecutor has directed the closure of the OSP investigation into  alleged bribery of high-ranking Ghanaian officials by Airbus SE, through  intermediaries, in respect of the sale of military transport aircraft by Airbus SE  to the Republic of Ghana between 2009 and 2015.  

7.2 The OSP would not institute criminal proceedings against any person in respect  of this investigation.  

7.3 The Special Prosecutor has also directed authorised officers of the OSP to  rescind the 13 May 2020 warrants of arrest obtained from the Circuit Court, 

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OSP REPORT ON INVESTIGATION Airbus SE 

Accra for the arrest of Samuel Adam Foster (also known as Samuel Adam  Mahama), Philip Sean Middlemiss, Leanne Sarah Davis, and Sarah Furneaux. 

7.4 On 8 August 2024, the Special Prosecutor notified INTERPOL of the  withdrawal of the Red Notice in respect of Samuel Adam Foster (also known as  Samuel Adam Mahama), Philip Sean Middlemiss, Leanne Sarah Davis, and Sarah  Furneaux. 

Kissi Agyebeng 

The Special Prosecutor 

The Republic of Ghana 

8 August 2024

24

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