- From Certificates to Commercial Scale: The Unfinished Work of AfCFTA
The African Continental Free Trade Area has created the framework for a much larger market. Its harder test is whether businesses can use that framework to grow production, sell across borders and make a sustainable profit.
That is the central argument of “AfCFTA Profit Moment: From Continental Trade Integration to Investment, Industrialisation and African Prosperity”, an analytical treatise on the agreement’s implementation between 2019 and 2026. It describes a “profit moment” as the point at which trade rules translate into commercial viability, investment and stronger company balance sheets.
The distinction matters. Tariff preferences can lower the cost of entering a market, but they cannot, on their own, supply a factory with reliable inputs, finance an export order or get goods through a congested border.
The treatise states that “tariff liberalisation alone cannot rectify Africa’s historical structural weaknesses” including fragmented markets, dependence on primary commodity exports and infrastructure gaps.
AfCFTA’s scale is compelling. The document describes a framework spanning 54 signatory states, 1.4 billion people and combined gross domestic product of more than US$3.4 trillion.
It is designed to remove tariffs on 97% of intra-African tariff lines, alongside efforts to address non-tariff barriers and align rules. But the size of the potential market should not be confused with the value of trade already taking place under the agreement.
The gap between ambition and execution is visible in the trade baseline presented in the treatise. It says intra-African trade has historically accounted for between 13% and 17% of the continent’s total exports, compared with 68% for intra-European trade and 59% for intra-Asian trade.
These figures are benchmarks used in the document; they do not establish the current level of AfCFTA-attributable trade. Their significance is that Africa’s commercial links with external markets remain much stronger than trade among African economies.
A continental market will not close that gap simply by removing customs duties. Businesses need to know which goods qualify for preferential treatment, obtain certificates of origin, meet product standards and secure customers and distribution beyond their home markets. If any link fails, a lower tariff may offer little practical advantage.
Ghana’s experience illustrates both progress and the limits of early evidence. The treatise cites an implementation update for 2024–2025 that recorded 43 certificates of origin issued to Ghanaian businesses, with three member companies of the Ghana Chamber of Commerce exporting processed goods to Cameroon.
It also identifies examples involving Kasapreko beverages, Ghandour cosmetics, KEDA Ghana Ceramics and Benso Oil Palm Plantation.
These cases show that the agreement can support real commercial transactions across different sectors. They are evidence of use, not proof of broad transformation.
The document itself cautions that the examples do not establish the scale of sustained trade growth across the continent, quantify total AfCFTA-attributable exports or profits, or show how many jobs the agreement has created.
That caution should shape the public assessment of the trade pact. A certificate issued is a step in an administrative process. A shipment is a market test. Neither, by itself, proves that a company has found repeat customers, increased its margins or expanded its workforce.
The more important measure is whether initial shipments become regular orders and whether companies can expand production without losing competitiveness.
The obstacles identified in the treatise help explain why that transition is difficult. Businesses continue to face delays in processing origin certificates, limited awareness of tariff concessions, high transport and logistics costs, different standards and certification requirements, customs bottlenecks, limited working capital and gaps in production capacity and technology.
Each constraint can erode the value of market access. A manufacturer may qualify for a tariff preference but still face expensive shipping. A food processor may have an export order but lack the working capital to buy inputs and wait for payment. A product may satisfy standards in one country but require testing or certification again in another. The tariff saving can disappear in the time and expense of getting the goods to the buyer.
Finance is therefore part of the trade architecture, not an optional supplement. The document says the AfCFTA Adjustment Fund was designed to help governments and firms manage the costs of adapting to a larger market.
It outlines support for institutional implementation, trade-enabling infrastructure and commercially viable private-sector projects. For firms, the investment need may involve machinery, packaging, laboratory testing, warehousing or export working capital.
Yet the fund’s reach should be judged by results, not by its design. The treatise points to a US$10 million loan announced for Telecel Global Services in 2025 as the first investment by the Adjustment Fund Credit Fund.
It also explicitly says this is one documented transaction, not evidence that financing has reached a broad cross-section of African small and medium-sized enterprises.
This is where the “profit moment” becomes a test of institutional performance. If companies cannot access affordable, appropriately structured finance, the opportunity may be captured mainly by firms already able to fund expansion.
If funding is available but customs procedures and standards remain unpredictable, capital may not produce the expected export growth. And if governments do not report approvals, disbursements and outcomes clearly, businesses will struggle to know whether the support system is working.
Payments and logistics present another test. The treatise highlights the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System as a way to support cross-border settlement in African currencies and reduce reliance on foreign currencies.
It also calls for more efficient customs systems and transport corridors. These reforms could reduce friction, but only if they operate reliably across the routes businesses actually use.
For Ghana, the opportunity is to turn the Secretariat’s presence in Accra and early exports into a stronger base for production and regional distribution.
That means helping firms understand origin rules, improving standards and testing capacity, and connecting finance to viable export plans. It also means measuring implementation through repeat trade, investment, value added and employment not just ratifications, launches and certificates.
AfCFTA is moving from legal commitments towards commercial use, but that shift is still incomplete. The treatise’s strongest contribution is to insist that market integration be judged by what happens inside firms and along supply chains.
The next stage will require evidence that businesses are investing, processing more locally, returning to markets with repeat shipments and hiring as orders grow.
The continent has negotiated the framework for a single market. Its “profit moment” will arrive only when that framework helps companies produce competitively and trade at scale. Until then, the promise of a vast African market remains larger than the commercial reality.
