- ACEP Calls for Tougher Oversight of GNPC as Petroleum Revenue Funding Comes Under Review
Ghana faces a defining decision over the future financing of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation as its statutory access to petroleum revenues approaches expiry in 2026, with the Africa Centre for Energy Policy warning that any extension should be tied to measurable performance, stronger governance and tighter parliamentary oversight.
Kodzo Yaotse, Policy Lead for Petroleum and Conventional Energy at ACEP, said GNPC’s continued access to public petroleum revenues should not be treated as an automatic entitlement, particularly after about US$3.20 billion was channelled to the corporation between 2011 and 2025.
“If we are going to amend it, are we going to allow business to run as usual, or are we going to tie the extension to triggers for performance?” Mr Yaotse asked.
“It is not just an automatic extension. It is something that is tied to how well the business is doing.”
He was speaking at the National Stakeholder Engagement on “GNPC Today: Mandate, Delivery, and the Road to Operatorship in the Context of Energy Transition,” organised by the Natural Resource Governance Institute in collaboration with GNPC.
At the centre of the debate is Section 7(3) of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, under which GNPC’s Net Carried and Participating Interest entitlement runs for 15 years from 2011 and is due to end in 2026.
Without legislative intervention, GNPC would subsequently have to rely more heavily on its own balance sheet to finance operations and investment.
ACEP argues that the approaching deadline provides an opportunity to reassess whether the corporation has generated adequate value from the public resources already committed to it.
Its analysis of Public Interest and Accountability Committee reports indicates that about US$1.79 billion of GNPC’s US$3.20 billion allocation went towards equity financing costs in producing fields, while roughly US$1.40 billion was available for investments and operational expenditure.
“Given the competing fiscal needs of the country, have these investments delivered value for the country?” Mr Yaotse asked.
The question is particularly important because petroleum revenues allocated to GNPC carry an opportunity cost. The same resources could otherwise support infrastructure, healthcare, education, debt reduction or economic diversification.
That makes continued state support increasingly difficult to justify unless GNPC can demonstrate that the capital is building commercially viable upstream capability.
GNPC has for years sought to move from being primarily a state participant in petroleum assets operated by international companies towards becoming an operator in its own right.
Its Accelerated Growth Strategy for 2012-2020 targeted standalone operatorship by 2019 and world-class operator status by 2027. Its current 2021-2030 strategy instead seeks to make GNPC a technically strong, commercially efficient and financially independent operator by 2030.
ACEP, however, argues that execution has not always matched ambition.
The Voltaian Basin project is one example. GNPC originally planned to acquire 2D seismic data, undertake environmental and community work and drill two wells between 2015 and 2019 at an estimated cost of US$60 million.
By the end of 2025, ACEP said close to US$150 million had been spent. About 1,832 line kilometres of seismic data had been acquired and the GH-VB-01 block delineated, but the two planned wells had still not been drilled.
“Since 2023, we’ve been given several timelines for which there will be drilling on the Voltaian Basin,” Mr Yaotse said.
He argued that the repeated slippages raise a central operatorship question: whether GNPC can execute complex upstream projects within credible timelines and budgets.
ACEP also pointed to the Saltpond decommissioning programme, where spending had reportedly reached US$85.13 million against an estimated US$66 million while the project remained about 60.00% complete.
The financial pressure is compounded by substantial receivables.
ACEP estimates that about US$1.27 billion is owed to GNPC, including US$681 million from Ghana National Gas Company and US$161 million from the Volta River Authority for gas supplied.
Other exposures cited include US$155 million in heavy fuel oil-related payments, US$117 million associated with Karpower guarantees and US$43 million connected to gas enclave roads.
“What safeguards would insulate a commercial GNPC from being used as a financing vehicle of last resort?” Mr Yaotse asked.
That tension goes to the heart of GNPC’s commercial challenge.
A corporation expected to build the balance sheet needed for exploration and operatorship cannot simultaneously absorb large quasi-fiscal obligations without weakening its financial capacity.
ACEP also questioned the scale and composition of GNPC’s social spending.
The GNPC Foundation received about US$160.74 million between 2018 and 2025, while ACEP said that in 2020, 71.80% of the corporation’s budget beyond field maintenance went towards corporate social responsibility, compared with about 9.00% for exploration and development.
For an aspiring operator, that allocation raises questions over whether social and commercial objectives are sufficiently separated.
Transparency around GNPC subsidiaries is another area of concern. ACEP highlighted revenues associated with JOHL, which holds a 7.00% commercial interest in Jubilee and TEN acquired for more than US$164 million in 2021 and subsequently transferred to EXPLORCO.
PIAC has argued that revenues from the interest should be paid into the Petroleum Holding Fund, while GNPC maintains that its subsidiary is not bound by the Petroleum Revenue Management Act.
ACEP said US$561.65 million had been retained by the end of 2025.
“If we succeed in creating a system where there is no visibility of certain portions of petroleum revenue, then we might as well just repeal the Petroleum Revenue [Management Act], because it will not serve any purpose,” Mr Yaotse said.
The debate therefore extends beyond whether GNPC should continue receiving petroleum revenues after 2026.
It raises more fundamental questions about what kind of national oil company Ghana wants to build: one dependent on statutory transfers, or one capable of demonstrating commercial discipline, financial independence and measurable returns.
ACEP wants any post-2026 support to come with performance conditions, periodic review, clearer governance of subsidiaries such as EXPLORCO, OPCO and JOHL, tighter limits on CSR and quasi-fiscal spending, and stronger disclosure requirements.
For Ghana, the approaching funding sunset offers an opportunity to reset the relationship between the state and GNPC.
What is increasingly being questioned is whether that importance alone should guarantee continued access to petroleum revenues or whether the next phase of support should come with a harder bargain: measurable commercial returns, disciplined capital allocation and accountability for every public dollar committed.
