- From Washington to Beijing, Ghana Risks Changing Partners Without Changing Its Economy
Ghana’s attempt to deepen its relationship with BRICS may appear to offer an escape from the economic orthodoxy, financing constraints and political influence associated with Western-led institutions. But replacing dependence on Washington, London and Brussels with greater reliance on Beijing, Moscow or New Delhi would not, by itself, change the structure that has repeatedly pushed the country into debt distress, currency depreciation and International Monetary Fund programmes.
That is the central warning contained in a policy paper by Ghanaian banking consultant Dr Richmond Akwasi Atuahene, which argues that the country’s economic future will be determined less by the international groupings it joins than by what it produces, processes, imports and exports.
The paper, titled Ghana Joining BRICS or Re-orienting Ghana’s Economic Destiny, questions whether membership of the emerging-market bloc can genuinely transform Ghana’s economy when the country continues to export raw gold, cocoa and crude oil while importing substantial quantities of finished goods, processed food, vehicles and industrial inputs.
Its conclusion is deliberately uncomfortable: Ghana could join BRICS and still remain poor, indebted and vulnerable if it carries the same unproductive economic structure into the new relationship.
“External economic alliances are tools, not cures,” Dr Atuahene writes. “Whether aligned with the global West or the global South, Ghana will remain economically fragile as long as its core economic structure remains colonial.”
The argument brings the BRICS debate home to an issue familiar to Ghanaian households and businesses. The cedi weakens when demand for dollars exceeds available supply. Food inflation rises when the country imports products it could potentially grow or process. Interest rates remain elevated when government borrowing absorbs domestic liquidity. Young people remain unemployed when national exports create more processing jobs abroad than they do at home.
BRICS may provide Ghana with new markets, political partnerships and sources of development finance. It cannot manufacture poultry locally, increase rice yields, process cocoa, refine crude oil, restore polluted rivers or compel governments to manage public money prudently.
Those responsibilities remain Ghana’s.
BRICS began as an informal grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China before South Africa joined in 2011. It has since expanded to include additional emerging economies, strengthening its claim to represent a significant share of the world’s population, output and natural resources.
The bloc’s attraction rests partly on dissatisfaction with the global financial system established after the Second World War. Developing countries have long argued that institutions such as the IMF and World Bank give disproportionate influence to advanced economies and impose policy conditions that do not always reflect the realities of poorer countries.
That dissatisfaction is especially powerful in Africa, which was largely excluded from the negotiations that created the Bretton Woods system.
“This system was created by rich countries to benefit rich countries,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres is quoted as saying in the paper. “Practically no African country was sitting at the table of the Bretton Woods Agreement.”
BRICS has sought to translate this frustration into institutions and practical alternatives. The New Development Bank finances infrastructure and sustainable-development projects, while the Contingent Reserve Arrangement provides members with financial support during balance-of-payments or currency pressures.
The bloc is also encouraging greater use of local currencies in cross-border trade, partly to reduce exposure to the US dollar and the financial sanctions that Washington can deploy through its influence over the international payments system.
For Ghana, these objectives have obvious appeal.
The country has endured repeated balance-of-payments crises, sharp exchange-rate depreciation and 17 engagements with the IMF since independence. Its most recent crisis resulted in a US$3 billion IMF-supported programme, a restructuring of domestic and external debt, losses for bondholders and severe pressure on businesses and household incomes.
Access to a wider pool of development finance could reduce Ghana’s dependence on a small number of external lenders. Trading in local currencies could potentially lower some transaction costs and ease the immediate demand for dollars. Closer links with China, India, Brazil and South Africa could also attract investment into infrastructure, agriculture, technology and industrial production.
The Ghanaian government’s justification for seeking a closer association with BRICS rests on those possibilities. According to the paper, the policy is intended to diversify economic partnerships, attract alternative development finance and support President John Dramani Mahama’s proposed economic transformation.
The government also expects deeper engagement with emerging markets to strengthen Ghana’s bargaining power within the evolving global order.
This is not an unreasonable ambition. Ghana should not have to choose between the West and the rest of the world. A small, open economy benefits from maintaining productive relationships with as many credible trading, investment and diplomatic partners as possible.
The real question is not whether Ghana should engage BRICS. It is whether the country has a sufficiently coherent domestic strategy to convert that engagement into industrial capacity, technology transfer, jobs and export revenue.
Without such a strategy, BRICS could become another platform through which Ghana exports commodities and imports manufactured goods.
Ghana’s economic structure has changed less fundamentally than headline growth figures sometimes suggest.
Gold, cocoa and crude oil dominate export earnings. Much of their final processing, branding, distribution and retailing takes place outside the country. Ghana consequently receives the value of the primary commodity but surrenders a large proportion of the income generated farther along the value chain.
At the same time, the country imports fuel, machinery, pharmaceuticals, vehicles, processed foods and basic agricultural products. These imports sustain consumption and production but generate a persistent need for foreign currency.
The structure produces a familiar cycle.
Commodity exports generate dollars, but import demand quickly absorbs them. When export prices fall, production declines or global financing becomes more expensive, the external position weakens. The cedi depreciates, imported goods become more expensive, inflation accelerates and the Bank of Ghana tightens monetary policy.
Higher interest rates then raise financing costs for domestic businesses, making local production less competitive and reinforcing dependence on imports.
Governments frequently respond to revenue shortfalls by borrowing. External debt introduces additional foreign-currency obligations, while domestic borrowing raises interest costs and can crowd private businesses out of the credit market. Eventually, debt servicing consumes resources that could have financed infrastructure, education, healthcare or industrial development.
BRICS membership does not automatically break this cycle.
Chinese machinery purchased by a Ghanaian company still has to be paid for. Indian pharmaceuticals, Brazilian poultry and Russian industrial inputs still represent imports. A loan from the New Development Bank must still finance a project capable of generating sufficient economic or fiscal returns to support repayment.
Even trade denominated in renminbi, rupees or another currency would not eliminate Ghana’s underlying external deficit. It would merely change the currency in which part of that deficit is settled.
The country therefore risks confusing financial innovation with structural transformation.
The deeper problem is not simply that Ghana lacks dollars. It is that the economy does not consistently produce enough internationally competitive goods and services to meet its demand for foreign products and capital.
A new settlement currency cannot compensate indefinitely for that production deficit.
The most immediate economic risk is that closer integration with BRICS could deepen Ghana’s existing trade imbalance.
China, India and Brazil possess large and increasingly sophisticated manufacturing bases. Their companies benefit from scale, established supply chains, substantial domestic markets, technological capabilities and, in some cases, strong state support.
Ghanaian manufacturers operate with high electricity costs, expensive credit, exchange-rate uncertainty, logistical weaknesses and a relatively small domestic market. Many struggle to compete even before additional foreign goods enter the market.
Greater market access without a corresponding industrial strategy could therefore turn Ghana into an even larger destination for BRICS-manufactured products while leaving its role as a supplier of gold, cocoa, oil and other raw materials largely unchanged.
The flag on the shipping container may change. The underlying trade relationship may not.
This is why the government must negotiate any BRICS relationship around clearly defined productive outcomes. Investment agreements should not be assessed solely by the size of the announced capital commitment. Policymakers must ask how much local processing will occur, how many sustainable jobs will be created, what technology will be transferred and whether Ghanaian suppliers will participate in the resulting value chains.
A cocoa arrangement, for example, should not merely increase the quantity of beans sold to a BRICS economy. It should expand Ghana’s capacity to produce cocoa liquor, butter, powder, chocolate, cosmetics and pharmaceutical inputs.
Mining partnerships should extend beyond extraction. They should include refining, fabrication, mineral-based manufacturing, geological knowledge, local procurement and environmental restoration.
Oil-sector investment should help Ghana develop refining, petrochemical and related industrial capacity rather than reinforcing the export of crude and import of refined petroleum products.
Without these conditions, Ghana would not be reorienting its economic destiny. It would be finding additional customers for the same colonial trade model.
Dr Atuahene’s paper uses Ghana’s food and vehicle imports to illustrate the scale of the structural problem.
It cites data showing that poultry imports were worth hundreds of millions of dollars in 2024, with Brazil among the principal suppliers. Ghana also spends substantial amounts importing rice, tomatoes, onions, sugar and other food products that could potentially support domestic agricultural and processing industries.
The paper reports that semi-milled and wholly milled rice imports were valued at about GH¢2.39 billion in 2025, with broken rice adding approximately GH¢1.19 billion. It also points to tomato and onion imports from neighbouring West African countries and farther afield.
Used vehicles with engine capacities ranging from 1,500cc to 3,000cc were said to have cost Ghana about GH¢9.33 billion in 2025.
Each individual import can be economically rational. Consumers need affordable food, transport and household products. Companies require machinery and intermediate goods that Ghana does not produce. Restricting imports without first developing competitive domestic alternatives could create shortages and raise prices.
But the aggregate pattern is difficult to ignore.
Ghana is using scarce foreign exchange to import large volumes of products for which it possesses some domestic production potential. It exports cocoa but imports chocolate. It exports crude oil but has historically imported substantial refined petroleum products. It produces tomatoes while importing tomato paste. It has large areas of cultivable land but remains dependent on imported rice and poultry.
These are not merely trade statistics. They represent jobs created elsewhere, tax revenue collected elsewhere and industrial knowledge accumulated elsewhere.
They also explain why periodic improvements in the trade balance do not always translate into lasting currency stability. Strong gold prices can temporarily increase export receipts, but the structural appetite for imports remains.
The cedi ultimately reflects the productive capacity of the economy behind it.
There are signs that value addition can change Ghana’s export profile.
The paper points to rising earnings from processed cocoa products, including cocoa paste, butter, powder and cake. It cites processed cocoa revenues of about US$1.8 billion in 2025, supported by significant increases in earnings from paste and butter.
Although high international cocoa prices contributed to the increase, the comparison between raw and processed exports demonstrates an important principle: the same agricultural commodity can generate different levels of income depending on where processing occurs.
Processing also creates a broader economic footprint. It requires factories, technicians, packaging, quality assurance, transportation, finance and marketing. These activities generate employment and deepen industrial capability in ways that shipping raw beans cannot.
The policy lesson extends beyond cocoa.
Ghana’s gold output could support a more extensive refining and jewellery industry. Bauxite could form part of an integrated aluminium value chain. Lithium and other transition minerals could support components and intermediate manufacturing, provided contracts protect the national interest and acknowledge environmental costs.
Agricultural production could feed domestic processing industries for poultry, rice, tomatoes, fruits, oils and animal feed.
BRICS partnerships could help finance and provide technology for these industries. But the initiative must begin with Ghana defining the value chains it wants to build. Foreign partners will naturally pursue their own commercial and strategic interests.
No external bloc will design Ghana’s industrial policy out of charity.
The urgency of economic restructuring is heightened by Ghana’s post-restructuring debt profile.
Dr Atuahene warns that the country faces substantial Eurobond and domestic debt obligations between 2027 and 2030. He argues that Ghana’s previous borrowing was not sufficiently directed towards productive projects capable of generating returns for repayment.
This distinction matters.
Debt is not inherently destructive. Borrowing to finance efficient power systems, transport infrastructure, irrigation, digital connectivity or commercially viable industrial projects can raise productivity and enlarge the economy’s future revenue base.
The danger arises when debt finances recurrent expenditure, politically driven projects or infrastructure whose economic returns are too low to cover the financing cost.
Ghana’s debt restructuring provided breathing space, but it did not erase the obligations. Deferred payments eventually return. If the productive base has not expanded by the time larger repayments fall due, government will again face difficult choices between taxation, expenditure cuts, refinancing and further restructuring.
BRICS financing could become valuable in this context if it offers longer maturities, lower costs and support for productive infrastructure.
It could become dangerous if policymakers treat it as another source of money for consumption, prestige projects or politically convenient spending.
Changing the lender does not change the consequences of an unproductive loan.
The paper is particularly blunt about governance, arguing that Ghana would take its domestic corruption problems into BRICS unless it first strengthens accountability.
It cites billions of cedis in financial irregularities and estimates of significant annual losses through corruption and public-sector waste.
These leakages have implications beyond the immediate loss of state revenue. Corruption raises the cost of infrastructure, weakens public services, discourages credible investors and diverts capital away from projects with the highest economic returns.
It also damages the credibility of industrial policy. Government support for selected sectors can become an avenue for patronage when contracts, tax incentives and credit facilities are not transparently administered.
BRICS membership would create additional channels for investment, procurement and state-to-state transactions. Without strong disclosure rules, parliamentary scrutiny and competitive procurement, those channels could expand opportunities for opaque deals rather than productive development.
Resource-backed financing presents a particular risk. Loans tied to future mineral or commodity revenues can provide immediate funding but reduce fiscal flexibility and obscure the true cost of borrowing.
Ghana must therefore approach alternative financing with the same discipline it should apply to Western capital: publish agreements, disclose beneficial ownership, assess debt implications and measure the economic returns.
A loan does not become developmental merely because it originates outside Bretton Woods.
Ghana’s pursuit of resource sovereignty also collides with the devastation caused by illegal and poorly regulated mining.
The paper describes galamsey as an environmental and public-health emergency that is contaminating rivers, destroying forests and converting agricultural land into hazardous, unreclaimed pits.
The Pra, Ankobra, Birim, Offin, Tano and Densu are among the river systems identified as suffering from severe pollution and sedimentation. Mercury and other chemicals used in mineral extraction threaten aquatic life, drinking-water systems, farming communities and public health.
This creates a contradiction at the heart of Ghana’s economic strategy.
Gold exports generate foreign exchange and strengthen the trade balance, but destructive mining imposes costs that rarely appear in export statistics. Water treatment becomes more expensive. Cocoa farms disappear. Food crops face contamination. Communities lose livelihoods, while future governments inherit the cost of restoring degraded land.
An economy cannot claim to be adding value if it destroys assets worth more than the revenue it records.
BRICS members may increase demand for Ghana’s minerals or offer investment in extractive industries. Ghana must ensure that this demand does not weaken environmental governance.
Resource sovereignty should mean more than the legal right to extract minerals. It must include the capacity to regulate extraction, protect communities, process resources domestically and ensure that the long-term national return exceeds the social and environmental cost.
The most politically consequential argument in Dr Atuahene’s paper concerns unemployment.
About 1.3 million young people between 15 and 24 are reported to be outside employment, education or training. The paper warns that prolonged joblessness can fuel crime, political vigilantism, irregular migration and alienation from the state.
This turns economic restructuring into a national-security requirement.
Ghana’s young population cannot be sustainably absorbed by an economy dominated by informal trade, low-productivity agriculture, public-sector employment and raw-material exports.
Nor can the government continue to present short-term recruitment exercises and temporary programmes as substitutes for productive private-sector growth.
Every major economic policy, including engagement with BRICS, should therefore be evaluated against a jobs test.
Will the relationship build industries that employ Ghanaians at scale? Will it deepen local supply chains? Will it create technical, managerial and engineering capabilities? Will Ghanaian companies gain access to new markets, or will foreign businesses simply gain easier access to Ghanaian consumers and resources?
If those questions are not answered, membership may deliver diplomatic prestige without economic transformation.
Ghana also needs to avoid presenting BRICS engagement as a rejection of the West.
The country maintains important trade, investment, security, educational and development relationships with the United States, European Union and United Kingdom. Its banks depend on correspondent relationships operating largely through the dollar-centred financial system.
Russia and Iran face extensive Western sanctions, while strategic competition between China and the United States is reshaping trade and technology policy. Deeper involvement with BRICS will consequently require careful diplomatic and financial management.
But Ghana does not need to make an artificial binary choice.
India maintains relations with both Russia and the West. The United Arab Emirates has strengthened ties with China while remaining a significant US security partner. Brazil continues to engage Western markets while advocating reform of global governance.
Ghana can pursue a similar policy of pragmatic multi-alignment, working with different partners according to its national interest.
The danger lies not in having several partners but in having no clear domestic strategy with which to engage them.
Dr Atuahene’s prescription is to dismantle what the paper calls the “Guggisberg economy”: a colonial economic structure designed to extract and export raw materials while importing finished products.
That will require more than speeches about industrialisation.
Ghana needs reliable and competitively priced electricity, efficient ports and transport networks, affordable long-term capital, predictable taxation and a regulatory system that does not punish formal businesses while tolerating informality and smuggling.
Agricultural policy must connect production to storage, processing, logistics and guaranteed markets. Industrial policy must identify realistic value chains rather than distribute incentives across too many disconnected initiatives.
Public procurement should deliberately build capable Ghanaian suppliers without sacrificing quality or value for money. Technical education must respond to the actual needs of manufacturing, mining services, agro-processing, energy and digital industries.
Fiscal policy must become sufficiently disciplined to prevent election cycles from repeatedly destabilising the economy. Debt must finance productive assets. Corruption must carry credible consequences. Environmental rules must apply even when commodity prices are high and politically connected actors are involved.
Domestic savings, pensions, insurance assets and capital markets should play a larger role in financing development so that every infrastructure ambition does not automatically become an external borrowing requirement.
None of these reforms is as visually dramatic as joining a global bloc. They are administratively difficult, politically costly and unlikely to produce immediate applause.
But they are the foundations upon which a useful BRICS relationship must rest.
The debate is therefore not simply BRICS versus the West. It is between structural transformation and continued dependence.
Ghana can join BRICS, maintain relations with Western partners, trade under the African Continental Free Trade Area and work with the IMF and World Bank. These relationships need not be mutually exclusive.
What Ghana cannot do is outsource responsibility for transforming its economy.
BRICS could provide markets, finance, technology and greater diplomatic space. It could help Ghana diversify its partnerships and reduce excessive exposure to a Western-dominated system.
But it cannot substitute for domestic production, disciplined public finances, clean government or credible institutions.
“Ghana’s ultimate economic salvation lies not in shifting geopolitical allegiances but in a radical domestic structural transformation,” Dr Atuahene concludes.
That is the standard against which any application to BRICS should be assessed.
If membership helps Ghana process more cocoa, refine more minerals, produce more food, create better jobs and rely less on unsustainable debt, it could form part of a serious national transformation.
If it merely adds new lenders, new suppliers and new diplomatic ceremonies while Ghana continues exporting raw materials and importing the products made from them, then the country will have changed its international alignment without changing its economic destiny.
The first path leads towards productive sovereignty.
The second simply gives an old dependency a new name.
