- Ghana’s Public Debt Ratio Climbs to 47.5% Of GDP as Domestic Borrowing Expands
Ghana’s public debt reached GH¢759.3 billion in October, equivalent to 47.5% of gross domestic product. This is according to the Bank of Ghana’s Summary of Economic and Financial Data, released on 17 November 2026
The ratio is higher than at the end of 2025, when it stood at 44.7%, even as the fiscal narrative has increasingly focused on stabilisation and rebuilding confidence.
The increase is not simply a story of a larger number in cedis. It reflects a substantial expansion in domestic debt, the changing cedi value of external obligations and the government’s cumulative financing position.
Together, the figures pose a difficult question for policymakers: how can Ghana preserve a lower-debt trajectory while meeting spending needs and avoiding renewed pressure on domestic financing?
The October stock was GH¢118.2 billion higher than the GH¢641.1 billion recorded at the end of December 2025 an increase of 18.4%. Over the same period, the debt-to-GDP ratio rose by 2.8 percentage points.
The year-on-year comparison offers a more qualified picture. In October 2025, public debt stood at GH¢685.8 billion, or 47.8% of GDP. The October 2026 ratio is therefore slightly lower than a year earlier, despite the larger nominal debt stock.
The debt ratio’s rise is measured from the end of 2025, not across the full year. That distinction matters: the latest figures show a deterioration from the year-end position, but they do not show a year-on-year increase in the ratio.
The composition of the debt helps explain the movement.
Domestic debt rose from GH¢333.8 billion at the end of 2025 to GH¢427.9 billion in October 2026, an increase of GH¢94.1 billion, or about 28.2%. It accounted for the bulk of the GH¢118.2 billion increase in the total cedi-denominated stock.
External debt, measured in US dollars, moved in the opposite direction. It fell from US$29.4 billion in December to US$28.5 billion in October. Yet its cedi value rose from GH¢307.4 billion to GH¢331.4 billion.
That apparent divergence illustrates how exchange-rate movements affect the local-currency value of foreign obligations: a lower dollar balance can still translate into a higher cedi amount.
By October, domestic debt represented GH¢427.9 billion, or 26.8% of GDP. External debt was GH¢331.4 billion, or 20.7% of GDP. The figures underline how closely Ghana’s debt position is tied to both its domestic borrowing requirements and the exchange rate.
The fiscal data show that financing pressures had intensified by October. Government revenue and grants reached 13.7% of GDP cumulatively, including tax revenue of 10.9%.
Total expenditure stood at 15.0% of GDP, leaving a cash overall deficit of 2.3% of GDP. The cash primary balance a measure that excludes interest costs was a surplus of just 0.1%.
The commitment-based balances look stronger, but also weakened between September and October.
The commitment primary surplus fell from 2.7% of GDP in September to 1.4% in October, while the commitment overall balance moved from a surplus of 0.3% to a deficit of 1.0%. The cash primary surplus also narrowed from 1.6% to 0.1%, and the cash overall deficit widened from 0.8% to 2.3%.
Those measures are not interchangeable. Cash balances record payments and receipts as they occur, while commitment balances capture obligations as they are made.
The gap between them is important for assessing how much pressure is building in public finances and whether commitments are being matched by available cash.
Net domestic financing rose to 2.7% of GDP in October, from 1.2% in September. Capital expenditure reached 2.6% of GDP, up from 2.1% the previous month.
The data do not specify how much of the financing increase was used for particular spending categories, but they show that the government’s borrowing and expenditure position became more strained in the latest month.
The central policy tension is visible in the figures. Ghana needs public investment to support growth, yet rising domestic debt can absorb funds that might otherwise be available to businesses and households. It can also leave the budget more exposed to interest costs and refinancing needs.
The report does not provide a debt-service-to-revenue ratio, so the precise burden of interest payments cannot be assessed from these tables alone. But the combination of a near-zero cash primary surplus and increased domestic financing makes the trajectory worth watching.
Nor should a lower debt ratio than October 2025 be treated as evidence that the recent increase has no consequence.
Debt sustainability depends not only on the ratio at a single point, but on whether the government can stabilise it while financing its priorities, managing refinancing needs and maintaining confidence in the currency. The October ratio’s rise from December is a reminder that improvement is not automatic.
The exchange-rate channel compounds the challenge. Although external debt fell in dollar terms during the period, its cedi value rose by GH¢24.0 billion.
This does not mean exchange-rate movements explain the entire increase in public debt; the larger rise was in domestic debt. It does show, however, that currency stability is directly relevant to the government’s reported debt burden.
The figures also sharpen the question of what counts as fiscal progress. A strong headline narrative may point to stabilisation, but the October data show a debt ratio higher than at year-end, weaker cash balances than in September and an increase in domestic financing.
Meanwhile, the year-on-year debt ratio is marginally lower. Both readings are true, and neither should be used without its time frame.
For policymakers, the test is whether the year-end improvement can be recovered without undercutting investment or shifting costs into unpaid obligations.
For investors and businesses, the composition of borrowing matters: a rising domestic debt stock can influence the supply and cost of local finance, while exchange-rate weakness can increase the cedi burden of foreign liabilities.
Ghana’s October debt figures do not, by themselves, settle whether the country is on or off a sustainable path. They do show that the path remains sensitive to domestic financing, fiscal execution and the exchange rate.
The question is no longer only whether the debt ratio is lower than it was a year ago. It is whether the government can prevent the year-end gains from being eroded again and explain clearly how it intends to do so.
