GoldBod’s FX Gains Dwarf BoG’s Trading Losses, New Report Shows
A new technical assessment of the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) indicates that the macroeconomic benefits from reduced gold smuggling and higher non-debt foreign exchange inflows far outweigh the trading losses recorded by the Bank of Ghana (BoG).
The report, prepared by economists from the University of Ghana for GoldBod, estimates that formalised artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) gold exports rose sharply in 2025, generating billions of dollars in additional foreign exchange that strengthened Ghana’s external position and eased pressure on the cedi.
According to the study, recorded ASM gold exports increased from 63.6 tonnes in 2024 to 103.0 tonnes in 2025. The incremental 39.4 tonnes is assessed as gold previously lost to smuggling but now routed through formal channels. Valued conservatively, this translated into about US$3.8 billion in additional foreign exchange entering the domestic financial system.
The authors compare these gains with the International Monetary Fund’s reported BoG trading loss of about US$214 million, noting a benefit-cost ratio of roughly 18:1. In practical terms, the report finds that formalising just 2.2 tonnes of gold would have been sufficient to offset the entire reported loss, underscoring the scale of the macroeconomic upside.
Beyond the direct inflow, the report highlights significant financing savings. GoldBod-enabled ASM exports amounted to about US$10.8 billion in 2025. Had Ghana borrowed externally to mobilise a similar volume of foreign exchange, annual interest costs would have ranged between US$756 million and US$1.08 billion. Even focusing only on the estimated reduction in smuggling, avoided interest costs were put at US$266–380 million per year, benefits described as recurring rather than one-off.
The assessment also links GoldBod-related inflows to broader macroeconomic outcomes, including higher international reserves—estimated at about US$11–12 billion—exchange-rate stabilisation relative to IMF budget assumptions, lower cedi costs of external debt service, a reduced import bill, and disinflation through weaker exchange-rate pass-through.
Importantly, the report argues that the BoG’s reported losses have been widely misunderstood. It explains that much of the loss reflects accounting translation effects rather than cash losses, arising from differences between the exchange rates used to purchase gold locally and those applied when booking FX inflows. The true economic cost of the gold pricing strategy—covering fees, purity losses and offtake discounts—is estimated at about 2.5 per cent of gold value, far below headline loss figures.
The authors conclude that GoldBod should be viewed not as a profit-seeking trading entity but as a macroeconomic stabilisation and formalisation tool. They recommend sustaining price competitiveness to deter smuggling, improving transparency in BoG reporting, gradually reducing policy costs as FX conditions normalise, and strengthening governance as GoldBod assumes fuller trading responsibility.
On the evidence presented, the report describes GoldBod as a high-return policy intervention that has converted illicit gold flows into formal FX, reduced reliance on costly external borrowing, and reinforced Ghana’s macroeconomic stability.
